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Major Academic Unit: Risk Management and Insurance 
 
 
This study examines the effects of pensions on the retirement decision, focusing 
on the differences between defined benefit (DB) plans and defined contribution (DC) 
plans. I find that DC plans have different effects on the accumulation of retirement 
wealth, the incentives for retirement and the risk of retirement benefits than DB plans. 
Thereby, DC plans have different effects from DB plans on the decision to retire. This 
paper is the first empirical study to investigate the effect of longevity risk in pension 
plans on retirement.  It is an important addition to the literature on retirement behavior 
since longevity risk will become more important as individuals have longer life 
expectancies and bear more longevity risk due to increasing likelihood of coverage by 
DC plans or Social Security personal accounts.   
Previous research has found that DB plans have an age-incentive effect on 
retirement. That is, the structure of DB plans may induce individuals to retire at a specific 
age.  By contrast, the structure of DC plans does not have age-incentive effects. Thereby, 
individuals with DC plans may retire either earlier or later on average than individuals 
with DB plans because of the absence of age-related incentives in DC plans. To shed 
further light on these issues, this study introduces risk factors, and particularly longevity 
risk, to an option value model of the retirement decision.  Longevity risk is important to 
DC participants since DC plans usually offer a lump-sum benefit at retirement. Since 
payouts are not guaranteed over life expectancy, retirees with DC plans bear a greater 
risk of outliving their resources, i.e., longevity risk. The additional risks in DC plans may 
make workers save more, and retire later.  
This paper extends a standard intertemporal model of consumption and retirement 
by incorporating risk factors for different pension types into the retirement decision 
problem. Comparative statics from the optimal solution show that increases in risk factors 
(i.e. longevity risk) during retirement induce workers with DC plans to retire later than 
workers with defined benefit (DB) plans. This study then tests the predictions of this 
model empirically, using the data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). 
Empirical results confirm the predictions of the theoretical model. First, workers with DC 
plans expect to retire later than workers with DB plans. Next, increase in pension option 
value, measured as the difference between the maximum pension value and the pension 
value of 1992, decreases the probability of retirement, thereby increasing the expected 
retirement wage. By contrast, greater pension wealth increases the probability of 
retirement, reducing the expected retirement age. Considering that pension wealth in DC 
plans is about half of pension wealth in DB plans, it is reasonable to conclude that 
workers with DC plans retire later than workers with DB plans. Finally, longevity risk, as 
measured by the Annuity Equivalent Wealth (AEW), decreases probability of retirement, 
increasing the expected retirement age.  
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I. Introduction 
This study examines the effect of pensions on the timing of retirement, focusing 
on the differences between defined benefit (DB) plans and defined contribution (DC) 
plans. The motivation for this research is from increases in expected longevity for the 
general population, the gradual shift from employer sponsored DB plans to DC plans 
since the 1980s, and the possibility of changing the structure of Social Security from a 
pure DB plan to one that incorporates DC type personal accounts.  Using an 
intertemporal model of the retirement decision that specifically incorporates DC plan 
specific longevity risk, I find that DC plans have different effects on the accumulation of 
the retirement wealth, the incentives for retirement and the risk of retirement benefits 
than DB plans. Thereby, DC plans have different effects from DB plans on the decision 
to retire. This paper is the first empirical study to investigate the effect of longevity risk 
in pension plans on retirement. It is an important addition to the literature on retirement 
behavior since longevity risk will become more important as individuals have longer life 
expectancies and bear more longevity risk due to increasing likelihood of coverage by 
DC plans or Social Security personal accounts.   
The growth in the coverage and benefits of private pension plans has been 
considered one of the major factors to reduce the labor force participation rate in old 
workers (Kaufman and Hotchkiss, 2000, p 134). A number of studies have found that the 
growth of DB plans has decreased the retirement ages of men during the second half of 
twentieth century in the United States (e.g. Anderson, 1999). Traditional DB pension 
plans increase the wealth in old age, and provide persons incentives to reduce hours of 
work or to retire. In particular, DB plans tend to have a particularly strong age-specific 
retirement incentives, since the marginal accrual of retirement benefits under DB plans 
starts to decline after a specific age, leading to decline in expected lifetime benefits. 
Therefore, individual’s retirement decision is likely to be strongly influenced by the 
desire to maximize lifetime retirement benefits.  
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There has been a gradual shift from DB plans to DC plans since the 1980s. Since 
the passage of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in 1974, the role 
of DC plans has increased in the retirement security system. Form 5500 data indicate that 
in 1980 61.4 percent of workers were covered by DB plans and 38.6 percent by DC plans. 
In 1999 these percentages were 31 percent and 69 percent, respectively (Figure 1).1 DB 
plans and DC plans have different effects on the accumulation of retirement wealth and 
the risk of retirement benefits. DC plans are age-neutral by design, and therefore they 
have none of the age-specific work disincentives that are common in traditional DB plans.  
Many earlier studies of retirement have focused on the effect of Social Security 
and DB plans and have found that DB plans have an age-incentive effect on retirement 
(Mitchell and Fields (1984), Stock and Wise (1990) and Samwick (1998)). While a 
number of researchers have studied the effect of DC plans on savings since the 1990s, 
little research has focused on the effect of DC plans on retirement. Friedberg and Webb 
(2000, 2003) find that individuals with DC plans retire almost two years later on average 
than individuals with DB plans because of the absence of age-related incentives in DC 
plans. Munnell, Cahill and Jivan (2003) confirm the delaying effect of DC plans on 
retirement age, but the expected size of effect is approximately one year. Sevak (2001) 
studies the effects of the stock market run-up in the 1990s, and shows that an unexpected 
increase in wealth in the 1990s would lead to an increase in retirement probability among 
individuals, ages 55 to 60. She also notes that the effect that Friedberg and Webb (2000) 
found may simply be a wealth effect.  
Age-incentive effects in DB plans suggest workers with DB plans near either the 
early or the normal retirement age may maximize their retirement wealth by opting to 
retire at the point where the marginal accrual to expected lifetime pension benefits is zero. 
                                                 
1 U.S. Department of Labor (2004), Private Pension Plan Bulletin: Abstract of 1999 Form 5500 Annual 
Reports. 
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However, it is not clear why non-existence of these financial incentives in DC plans 
causes workers with DC plans to retire later than workers with DB plans. Workers with 
DC plans may work longer since DC plans do not have a normal retirement age clause, 
and the present value of pension benefits does not decline like DB plans. Workers with 
DC plans may also retire earlier, since they do not have to consider the normal retirement 
age, i.e., there is no big increase in pension benefits under DB and no incentive to defer 
retirement. To shed further light on these issues, this study introduces one more factor 
that may affect the retirement decision, the difference in risk sharing between DB plans 
and DC plans. The individuals with DC plans are responsible for their investment risk 
during the accumulation period. DC plans usually offer a lump-sum benefit at retirement. 
One of the primary concerns about lump-sum distributions is that retirees will spend their 
money too fast during the initial phase of their retirement depleting their resources before 
they die (McGill, Brown, Haley, and Schieber, 2005, p.444). Since payouts are not 
guaranteed, retirees have to bear the longevity risk as well as the investment risk after 
retirement (Brown, 2000). As Mankiw (1999, p.454) says, the workers with DC plans 
may respond to this uncertainty by saving more in order to better prepare for these 
contingencies. These precautionary savings may require a longer working period. 
Sheshinski (2004) also suggests that longevity risk can affect the retirement timing. The 
additional risks in DC plans may make workers save more, and retire later.  
Considering the increasing share of retirement savings is facilitated by DC plans, 
it is important to understand the effect of DC plans on retirement. For example, after a 
long period of decline, the labor participation rates of older men stabilized or even 
increased slightly after 1985. The gradual shift from DB plans to DC plans since the early 
1980s may be a reason for the slowdown or reversal of retirement trends in recent years 
(Quinn, 1999). This issue will become more important in the future if individuals are 
expected to bear more risk in accumulating their retirement income and more longevity 
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risk due to increasing numbers of DC plans or Social Security privatization. Social 
Security privatization may increase labor supply, since the privatization will increase the 
longevity risk (Nishiyama and Smetters (2005)).   
It is fair to say that much of U.S. retirement security policy over the past 70 years 
has been commingled with labor force policy.2 Given that the baby boom generation in 
U.S will start to retire soon in large numbers, labor market policies that encourage the old 
worker in the labor force may be necessary.  However, if individuals with DC plans retire 
later due to their anxieties concerning an unstable retirement income, policy makers 
should consider DC pensioners’ difficulties in designing future retirement systems. This 
has implications for the current debate over Social Security reform. If Social Security is 
privatized, the reform should incorporate a mechanism that helps diversify longevity risk. 
For employers, DB plans have been a tool to induce older workers to retire. If DC plans 
have no incentive effects like DB plans and workers with DC plans have concern about 
longevity risk, employers should consider the adoption of a more favorable annuity 
clause in their DC plans to achieve their objectives. If employers are unwilling to offer 
more favorable annuity terms, then Congress can enact legislation requiring partial or full 
annuitization of DC account balances. 
The next section discusses the implications of DC plans for retirement, and 
provides a brief review of the previous studies on the effect of pensions on retirement. 
Section III describes the model, data and estimation process. Section IV presents the 
estimation results and explanations. Section V concludes with some findings from this 
analysis.   
                                                 
2 Indeed, DB retirement rules have historically been designed to encourage older workers to exit the labor 
force. 
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II. Literature Review  
1. Historical and Institutional Background  
This section will provide the overview of the historical and institutional 
background of the U.S. labor markets and private pensions. The overview covers 
retirement trends, the shift of private pension coverage from DB plans to DC plans, and 
the description and the comparison of DB plans and DC plans.  
The labor force participation rates of men, particularly of older men have 
decreased for the last 40 years in the United States. In 1950, 72 percent of men aged 65 
were still in the labor force, as were 81 percent of those aged 62 (Figure 2) (Quinn, 1999). 
By 1970, the participation rate for men aged 62 had dropped to 74 percent. By 1985, only 
half of those aged 62 were still in the labor force. By this time, the participation rate for 
men aged 65 had dropped to 30 percent, while the rate for men aged 70 was only 16 
percent. After a long period of decline, the participation rates of older men stabilized or 
even increased slightly after 1985. The growth of the coverage and benefits from Social 
Security and private pension plans is considered an important reason for the decline in 
participation rates among older men (Kaufman and Hotchkiss, 2000, p. 133-137). Other 
important reasons include the inverted-U type lifecycle pattern of real wage rate, long-run 
rise in real wages, the growth in disability benefits, increases in average household 
wealth, and decreased demand for low-skilled workers.  
Pension coverage, participation, and benefits grew rapidly between the early 
1940s and the 1970s. Between 1940 and 1973, the number of retirees receiving pension 
benefits increased from 200,000 to 6 million and the number of covered employees rose 
from 4.1 million to 35 million. The growth of pension coverage in the early postwar 
period is estimated to account for one-fourth of the contemporaneous decline in labor 
force participation rates (Samwick, 1998). In addition to the growth of private pension 
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plans, the shift from DB plans to DC plans is another remarkable characteristic in the U.S 
pension history. Since ERISA in 1974, the majority of new plans have been DC plans. 
Form 5500 data indicate that in 1980 61.4 percent of workers were covered by DB plans 
and 38.6 percent by DC plans. In 1999 these percentages were 31 percent and 69 percent, 
respectively. The shift from DB plans toward DC plans is also reflected in the number of 
pension plans. The number of DB plans increased from 148,096 in 1980 to 175,000 in 
1983, but then decreased to 101,000 by 1990, and to 56,405 by 1998 (Figure 1). By 
contrast, the number of DC plans doubled over the same period, from 340,805 in 1980 to 
673,626 in 1998. A result of this shift in coverage is that assets in DC plans began 
accumulating more rapidly than those in DB plans. By 1997, assets of DC plans also 
surpassed assets in DB plans beginning with 1997. The reasons behind the shift include 
tax advantages, the cost of plan administration and the federal government’s implicit 
emphasis on DC plans (Allen, Melone, Rosenbloom, and Mahoney, 2003). 3  
Before discussing specific impacts of pension types on retirement, it is important 
to understand the basic aspects of pension types. Private pensions are typically classified 
into two broad types according to the obligations assumed by an employer. The 
obligations may take one of two forms: (1) to provide benefits according to a specific 
schedule, or (2) to contribute funds on a specific basis (McGill et. al., 2005, p. 236). By 
law, DB plans provide definitely determinable benefits, usually based on an employee’s 
service and/or pay, while DC plans provide fixed contributions and base benefits solely 
on the contribution and accumulation.  
In a DB plan, the amount of benefits, and the forms and the time of payment are 
established in advance by rules, and employer contributions are considered a variable 
factor. Two basic forms of benefit formulas are the unit benefit formula and the flat 
                                                 
3 Allen et al. (2003) provides the backgrounds of the historical preference for DB plans over DC plans 
(pp.48-50).  
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benefit formula. The unit formula credits an explicit unit of benefit (as a percentage of 
compensation or as a specific dollar amount4) for each year of service. The unit of benefit 
can be based on the compensation during every year (the career average formula) or the 
participant’s average compensation during a specific period (three, five, or 10 years) 
before retirement (the final average formula). A flat benefit formulas provide a benefit at 
retirement equal to a specified percentage (e.g. 30, 40, or 50 percent) or flat dollar 
amount of compensation (normally average earnings during a specific period before 
retirement), without regard to years of service. The second important aspect of retirement 
benefits in DB plans is the time of payment. Since most DB plans promise to pay a 
retirement benefit throughout the remaining lifetime of the retired employee, the forms of 
benefit is typically an annuity and DB plans specify the age from which payment of 
benefit may start. However, some plans allow taking a lump-sum distribution of the 
present discounted value of the expected lifetime benefits. Under this condition, 
participants can receive the full amount of accrued benefits upon retirement or after 
reaching a specified age (normal retirement age).5 In many DB plans, a participant may 
retire earlier than the normal retirement age with reduced benefits, subject to specified 
conditions. Many employers frequently use early retirement factors that are more 
favorable than the actuarially fair reduction factor to induce early retirement.  
DC plans define the amount of contribution to a participant’s account. There are 
various types of DC plans: money purchase pension plans, profit-sharing sharing plans, 
stock bonus plan, employee stock ownership plan, cash or deferred plans under Section 
401(k), thrift and savings plans and 403(b) plans. 6  Under a money purchase plan, 
                                                 
4 A percentage unit is the usual procedure under a plan for salaried employees (McGill et al., 2005, p.236), 
and a dollar amount unit tends to be found in a collectively bargained plan. 
5 By law, the normal retirement age not later than age 65 should be specified in the plan. 
6 See, for example, McGill’s (2005) chapter 11 and Allen et. al. (2003) chater7- chapter12 for the detailed 
descriptions of each form of DC plan. 
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employer contributions are fixed as a percentage of pay or as a flat dollar amount. On the 
contrary, under profit sharing plans contributions are variable according to profits are 
made on a discretionary, voluntary basis. A stock bonus plan is similar to a profit-sharing 
plan, except that benefits are distributed in stock of the employer company. An employee 
stock ownership plan (ESOP) invests in employer stock. An ESOP should be either a 
stock bonus plans or money purchase plan. Under 401(k) plans, employees can choose to 
take compensation in the form of cash or as a tax-deferred contribution accumulated in a 
qualified retirement saving account.7 Under a thrift and savings plan employees make 
voluntary after-tax contributions to their accounts. Finally, a 403(b) plan is a kind of DC 
plan for employees of public educational institutions and certain nonprofit tax-exempt 
organizations.  
DB plans and DC plans have different characteristics and relative advantages to 
employers and employees. For example, DC plans typically have shorter vesting periods 
and, since the advent of section 401(k) in 1978, employee pre-tax elective contributions 
are an important component of DC pension wealth. Many workers also prefer DC plans 
because of portability between jobs.8 While these differences may be important to plan 
selection by employers and job sorting among employees, they do not inherently impact 
the retirement decision. However, differences in the risk characteristics of DB and DC 
pensions may inherently affect the retirement decision. One of greatest sources of risk to 
a worker participating in a DC plan is the investment performance of the fund (Bajtelsmit 
and Vanderhei, 1998). For workers who voluntarily fund their DC plans, underfunding 
provides another source of retirement risk.  In DC plans, ultimate retirement income is 
dependent on the level of contributions made to the plan, investment performance of each 
                                                 
7 This feature is referred to a Cash Or Deferred Account (CODA). 
8 However, if the contribution rate is related to service year, the portability of DC plans will decrease 
(Bodie, Marcus, and Merton, 1988). 
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participant’s account, and the length of time between contributions and distributions. By 
comparison, DB plans typically provide retirement benefits based on years of service and 
level of pay during the last few years before retirement. By law, employers are typically 
responsible for insuring that the pension trust is adequately funded, both by funding 
accruing liabilities and by replacing any assets lost due to poor investment performance. 
Thus, DC plan participants face much greater uncertainty regarding the expected level of 
retirement benefits and increasing short-term investment risk as they approach retirement. 
By comparison, the benefits in DB plans become more certain as employees approach 
retirement. It has been argued that the shifting of risk to employees is detrimental to 
retirement income security. Workers with DC plans likely face more risks after 
retirement than those who have DB plans. Retirees with DC plans must decide how to 
invest the money and should bear the related risk. The investment risk should be 
considered in valuing the pension wealth.  
 
2. Retirement Wealth  
Pensions impact the retirement decision by changing the structure and level of 
retirement wealth. The wealth effect of pensions on retirement can be analyzed in the 
framework of labor-leisure model. The income effect occurs because pensions increase 
the retirement income of a potential retiree. Assuming leisure is a normal good, the 
demand for leisure increases as expected income rises. Pensions also change the cost of 
retirement leisure to the worker. The cost of retiring a year earlier is the lost earnings. If 
the replacement rate is 100%, then the price of leisure is zero. Since replacement rate is 
less than 100%, there is a price to be paid by retiring (Bruce, 2001, p.266). All else equal, 
workers should balance the benefits of retiring earlier against the cost of a smaller 
monthly payment.  
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The literature on effects of pension wealth on retirement can be classified into two 
groups. In the first group, a broad literature attempts to answer the question of whether 
pensions can affect the retirement wealth. The second group of literature focuses on the 
wealth effect on the retirement decision. The effect of pension on wealth accumulation 
has been studied much, even though there remain some disagreements. The main issue is 
whether pensions savings are new savings or simply shifting out of other, less tax-
advantaged forms of savings. The life-cycle hypothesis implies that pensions should 
offset non-pension wealth dollar-for-dollar. Many empirical studies find that pension 
wealth reduces non-pension wealth, but the reduction is much less than 100 cents per 
dollar of pension wealth.9 Social security wealth is also found to offset non-pension 
wealth.10  More recently, Gustman and Steinmeir (1999) use the 1992 data of the Health 
and Retirement Study (HRS) and find that pensions displace only a fraction of other 
savings, or there is no displacement at all. Gale (1998) emphasizes, however, that the 
estimated offsets in previous empirical studies are smaller than the true offset because of 
systematic econometric biases. According to these studies, pension wealth can cause 
early retirement through increased wealth, even though the total wealth does not increase 
by the pension wealth because of a partial canceling effect. However, these studies 
typically do not model or discuss the impact on the retirement decision from the different 
risk characteristics inherent to pension versus non-pension wealth.  
Pension types can influence retirement wealth accumulation and retirement 
decision. There are some reasons for the retirement wealth from two types of pension 
plans to differ. For example, considering the differences in the pension formula, the 
nature of employers and administrative cost, it may be natural to think that the benefits 
from two types of pension plans will be different. Whether DC plans provide retirement 
                                                 
9  For example, King and Dicks-Mireaux (1982). 
10 The effects of Social Security on saving are summarized well in Feldstein and Liebman (2002). 
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benefits comparable to DB plans is an empirical problem. The potential different effect of 
pension types on wealth has also been studied.11   
Samwick and Skinner (1998) consider the question how the emergence of DC 
plans, such as 401(k) plans, has affected the financial security of future retirees, using a 
detailed survey of pension formulas in the Survey of Consumer Finances. Their 
simulations show that average and median pension benefits are higher under DC plans 
than for DB plans, implying that DC plans can strengthen the financial security of retirees. 
The increased retirement wealth may cause workers to retire early. They also find that 
DC plans are indeed more risky, in the sense that the variance of retirement income is 
greater than for DB plans, while the expected returns are higher. According to Even and 
Macpherson’s (1998) simulation using the 1992 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) and 
the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) data, mean and median benefits in DC plans are 
projected to be greater than in DB plans. However, 401(k) plans generate lower benefits 
than DB plans for low income workers.  
Gustman, Mitchell and Steinmeier (1997) derive different results and conclusions. 
The mean value of the DC plans in 1992 is significantly below the comparable value for 
DB plans. One reason for the difference is that cumulative earnings paid to those covered 
by DC plans are about 20 percent lower than are the cumulative earnings paid to those 
covered by DB plans. So the results do not contradict Samwick and Skinner’s (1998) 
simulation in which identical earning histories are assumed. Blank (1999) runs a 
regression of retirement wealth on the pension type dummies and other control variables 
such as investment strategies in DC plans, using the Health and Retirement Study data. 
She finds that a DB plan appears to contribute almost $0.8 million toward retirement 
                                                 
11 A related strand of the literature explores the impact of the booming stock market of the late 1990s on 
changes in wealth: See Sevak (2001), Gustman and Steinmeier (2002), Coronado and Perozek (2003), 
Kezdi and Sevak (2004), and Coile and Levine (2004). 
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resources as compared to individuals without any pension plans. DC plans investing in a 
combination of stocks and bonds appear to contribute more than $1.33 million dollars to 
retirement wealth, while other DC plans do not appear significant. She concludes that 
regression results suggest that workers with DB plans appear to have more retirement 
resources than those who have no pension or have a DC plan. However, these results may 
be interpreted as the evidence that DC plans have more variability than DB plans. 
Friedberg and Webb (2003) find significant differences in pension wealth across pension 
plans. For 1992, the median pension wealth of those who have both DB and DC plans is 
$345,156 if the workers retire at age 65, while the amount in DB plans is $203,949. The 
median pension wealth in DC is the lowest of $102,298. If the wealth effect of pension 
enables workers to retire earlier, then the workers with DC plans expected to retire later, 
other things being equal.  
The wealth effect on the retirement decision has been studied extensively. 
Exploiting natural experiments resulting from policy changes, Krueger and Pischke 
(1992) find little evidence of an increase in labor supply for workers born between 1917 
and 1921, and who experienced a dramatic reduction in Social Security benefits due to a 
law change. Recent research examining the role of wealth shocks more broadly has relied 
on sources of variation in retirement wealth that are exogenous to an individual’s 
preferences for leisure. For instance, several authors have focused on inheritances and 
lottery winnings. Joulfaian and Wilhelm (1994) estimate relatively modest effects of 
inheritances on the retirement decisions of older men. In contrast, Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, 
and Rosen (1993) find that working-age individuals receiving large inheritances are three 
to four times more likely to exit the labor force than individuals receiving small 
inheritances. Imbens, Rubin, and Sacerdote (2001) estimate that lottery winners consume 
about 11 percent of their winnings in the form of reduced labor earnings and that the 
effect is about one-third larger for individuals aged 55 to 65.  
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A second related strand of the literature explores the impact of unexpected 
changes in wealth associated with stock market fluctuations, and largely the boom of the 
late 1990s, on retirement decisions. Sevak (2001) finds that unexpected increase in 
wealth in the 1990s would lead to an increase in retirement probability among individuals 
aged 55 to 60. Other researchers confirm that large positive wealth shocks can reduce 
labor supply (Cheng and French, 2000; Coronado and Perozek, 2003). Cheng and French 
(2000), however, also point out that labor force participation rates for individuals aged 55 
and older have increased since 1995. Increases in stock market wealth should cause 
reductions in labor force participation, all other things equal. They conclude that the 
stock market has not been the dominant factor in influencing labor force participation. 
Gustman and Steinmeier (2002) finds that the extraordinary returns in the stock market in 
the late 1990’s increased retirement for the HRS sample of workers by over 3 percent by 
the turn of century and that the subsequent decline in the market neutralized the effect of 
the preceding stock market gains on retirement. Coronado and Perozek (2003) reach a 
similar finding that those who received unanticipated equity gains during the market 
boom of the late 1990s retired earlier than they had anticipated. Using the panel data 
covering the period 1992 through 2000 from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), 
Kezdi and Sevak (2004) explore the effect of bust in stock market and conclude that CPS 
respondents with dividend income are less likely to retire in 2001 and 2002 than 
respondents without dividend income. Coile and Levine (2004), however, find little 
support for an impact of the boom and bust on retirement.  
Munnell et al. (2003) report that level of pension wealth in DB plans has a larger 
effect on reducing retirement age than the counterpart of DC plans. In their regression, 
the pension characteristics have opposite effects on retirement age: DB plans reduce the 
retirement age, but DC plans increase the retirement age. However, they do not provide 
any explanations on why pension wealth has different magnitudes of effect on retirement 
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age or why the pension characteristics (dummies) have opposite sign. These differences 
may reflect the difference in risk sharing of pension wealth.  
To summarize, assuming the normality of leisure, higher wealth reduces labor 
supply. Many researchers show that increase in wealth from a booming stock market in 
1990s prompts workers to reduce labor supply or retire early. Overall, despite some 
inconsistent results, increased wealth is estimated to accelerate the timing of retirement.  
 
3. Age-specific Retirement Incentives 
DB plans are typically structured such that workers are encouraged to retire at 
specific ages. DB plans generally reward workers for years of service in the form of a 
higher annual pension during each year of retirement. However, the value of that reward 
can decline as the worker lengthens his career past the age where the worker’s expected 
lifetime benefit is maximized. The reason is that the worker, at a certain age, foregoing a 
year of benefits for another year of contributions has a negative effect of expected 
lifetime benefits. That is, the expected present value of pension benefits is a single-
peaked function of age (Lazear, 1995, pp.42-45). DB plans therefore encourage workers 
to retire at specific dates, that is, at the peak of the pension value. By comparison, DC 
plans never exhibit single-peaked maximum values. The expected present value of DC 
plans may rise with age of retirement, since expected pension payments do not directly 
depend on the number of years left in a person’s life (Lazear, 1998, pp.423-424).  
In addition, in typical DB plans, pension wealth does not increase smoothly. For 
example, in retirement plans subject to a vesting schedule, accruals are zero until the 
individual achieves some vested right. At this point, there is a first accrual spike 
representing the value of marginal benefit accruals for all prior years of work. From this 
point on, annual benefit accruals increase smoothly until the worker is eligible to retire 
and start receiving a pension benefit. Typically, there are large spikes in benefit accruals 
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when the worker satisfies the age and service requirements for early and normal 
retirement benefits. After the initial age of eligibility has been attained, accrual 
calculations become more complex, because one must weigh higher benefits in the future 
derived from continued employment against benefits foregone while the employee 
continues working. Typically, benefit accruals begin to decline after the age of initial 
eligibility and can eventually become negative if the individual remains with the firm at 
older ages. This decline in pension wealth provides an incentive for the worker to leave 
the firm. 
Kotlikoff and Wise (1987) estimate pension accruals, that is, the increment to 
pension wealth in excess of the return on the previously accumulated pension account. 
They find that pension plans provide substantial incentives to quit work after early 
retirement age and greater incentives to leave after normal retirement age. They calculate 
the pension accrual as a percentage of wage at each age.12 Figure 3 shows the pension 
accruals. The typical pension plans (10 year cliff vesting, early retirement age 55, normal 
retirement age 65) that Kotlikoff and Wise (1987) use for calculating pension accruals 
provides 62.57 percent of pension accruals to workers at age 34 who started work at age 
25. The pension accruals increase continuously up to early retirement age 55, but after 
early retirement age, the pension accruals start to decrease and become negative after 
                                                 
12 Vested pension benefit accrual at age a, I(a), is equals the difference between pension wealth at age a +1, 
Pw (a+1) and pension wealth at age a, Pw(a), accumulated to age a+1 at the nominal interest rate r, that is, 
I(a) = Pw(a+1) − Pw(a+1)(1+r). Pension wealth at age a is defined as the expected value of vested pension 
benefits discounted age a. Figure 2 shows the ratio of I(a) to W(a) for a worker age a with t years of 
service. Worker is assumed to start to work age 25. 
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normal retirement age 65.13 Cumulative pension wealth keeps increasing up to normal 
retirement age and starts to decrease after normal retirement age.  
There is an extensive literature on the influence of pension incentive on individual 
retirement decisions. Much of the research has focused on annual pension accrual, since 
it is the central mechanism by which pension plans affect individuals’ retirement 
decisions. DC plans, however, have a different structure. Recently, some researchers have 
examined the differences between DB plans and DC plans. Mitchell and Fields (1984) 
examine the role of economic factors in determining retirement behavior using a unique 
archive on more than 8,700 workers covered by ten different pension plans. Their results 
indicate that persons with more income retire earlier, and that individuals who have more 
to gain by postponing retirement retire later. They also find that lifetime benefits were 
maximized at age 62 or earlier in nine of the ten plans. Lazear and Moore (1988) suggest 
that by delaying retirement individuals retain the option to retire at a later date, under 
potentially more advantageous terms and that turnover at a point in time depends on 
future considerations as well as current ones. They demonstrate that a ten percent 
increase in the option value of retirement pensions reduces the probability of turnover for 
old workers by 22 percent, using the profiles of hypothetical employees under the six 
different plans.  
Stock and Wise (1990) propose the “option” model, which incorporates Social 
Security accruals and pension accruals into the analysis, and estimated total annual 
compensation for a cohort of workers in a single firm, for every age in the future. In 
every year, workers have the option to retire now or delay the retirement until the next 
year. They value this right to choose the retirement timing by comparing the pension 
                                                 
13 According to employer’s personnel policy, the benefit accrual pattern may be different. McGill et al. 
(2005, p.502) points out DB plans do not work exactly as Kotlikoff and Wise analyzed them in the 
treatment of early retirement supplements or the availability of lump-sum distribution.  
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benefits that can be received if workers retire today and the pension value that can be 
received if they retire later plus the earnings to retirement. Predicted departure rates based 
on the model corresponded closely to actual departure rates. In particular, discontinuous 
jumps in retirement rates from 54 to 55 and from 61 to 62 are captured by the model 
predictions. Samwick (1998) extends Stock and Wise’s analysis to a broader sample, by 
combining the demographic, employment and wealth data on older households in the 
1983 and 1986 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) with detailed pension information 
provided by employers in a special SCF supplement. He shows that results of Stock and 
Wise (1990) model based on one firm’s data still remain valid. Samwick finds that 
retirement wealth accruals are more important than retirement wealth levels, and that it is 
pension wealth, not Social Security wealth, that primarily determines the change in 
retirement wealth. He estimates that about one-quarter of the decline in labor force 
participation of older men between 1955 and 1975 was due to expanded pension 
coverage. Increasing coverage by approximately 50 percent generates a reduction in labor 
force participation of about 5 percentage points. This reduction is roughly 27 percent of 
the actual reduction that occurred during the period when pension coverage was extended 
by this amount.  
Friedberg and Webb (2003) analyze the effects of pension types on retirement 
decisions, using the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS). Their estimates indicate that 
financial incentives in DB plans lead people to retire almost two years earlier on average, 
compared to people with DC plans. Chan and Stevens (2004) employ a fixed-effect 
regression technique to control for unobserved heterogeneity and investigates the effects 
of pension wealth accumulations measured by peak value on individuals’ retirement 
expectations. They find significant effects of future pension wealth accumulation on 
retirement expectations.  
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Many researchers have found that DB plans have an age-incentive effect on 
retirement. However, why the financial incentives in DB plans cause workers to retire 
earlier than workers with DC plans is not clear. When there is no age incentive to 
retirement in DC plans, why do workers with DC plans retire later than worker with DB 
plans? They may retire earlier, since they do not have to consider the normal retirement 
age. If workers with DC plans retire later without any constraint such as an age-incentive 
in DB plans, this implies there are other constraints that prohibits workers with DC plans 
from leaving the labor force early. That is, the cause that enables workers with DB plans 
to retire early may be a simple wealth effect. The evidence from the 1990s stock market 
boom shows that if workers with DC plans have enough retirement wealth, then they may 
retire early. As discussed next section, the increased longevity risk in DC may be another 
factor that induces workers with DC plans to retire later. 
 
4. Longevity Risk 
One of the important risks that a retiree with DC plans bears is the longevity risk. 
Longevity risk means the risk that one outlives one’s wealth. Longevity risk comes from 
the fact that a retiree’s remaining lifespan is not a certain period. DC plans typically offer 
a lump sum, while DB plans offer a life annuity that deals with longevity risks. Workers 
with DC plans may either spend their money too fast during the initial phase of their 
retirement, depleting their resources before they die or they will spend it too slowly, 
conserving capital just in case they live an unexpected long life. In both cases, the retirees 
will end up with having less disposable income to meet retirement consumption needs 
than is optimal for some period of their retirement (McGill et. al. (2004), p.444). 
Considering higher longevity risks, workers with DC plans may desire a higher level of 
wealth in retirement to maintain equivalent level of consumption. In order to save more, 
workers may choose to retire later. Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) show that annuities can 
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increase the utility by eliminating the longevity risk. In their model, the consumption path 
with annuity market attains constant consumptions, while the consumption paths without 
an annuity market have a negative slope.14  
Having lump-sum retirement benefits at the end of their career does not mean that 
these individuals have to bear longevity risks. Some DC plans provide annuitization 
options and even when DC plans do not provide any annuitization option, individuals can 
buy annuities from private markets. Individuals can deal with longevity risk by 
converting their retirement savings into steady and reliable income streams over their 
remaining lives, i.e., buying an annuity at retirement with savings. Brown (2000) points 
out that lump-sum payments in DC plans fail to provide a formal mechanism by which 
individuals can insure against longevity risk, and suggests that annuities are a way of 
insuring against longevity risk. One of the main issues concerning annuitization of 
retirement benefits is how many workers are willing to annuitize and actually annuitize 
their retirement wealth. Brown (2001) examines household decisions about whether or 
not to annuitize retirement resources, using the HRS data.15 He runs probit regression of 
dummy variable for the willingness to annuitize balances in DC plans on the annuity 
equivalent wealth and other control variables. He finds that a one-percentage point 
increase in the annuity equivalent wealth leads to nearly a one-percentage point increase 
in the probability of annuitizing balances in DC plans. Contrary to theoretical prediction, 
in reality, many retirees do not choose annuity options and demand for annuities is lower 
than theoretical predictions.16 For example, Moore and Mitchell (2000) report that Social 
                                                 
14 The slope of consumption path depends on the degree of relative risk aversion. The higher the degree of 
relative risk aversion, the flatter the slope of the consumption path.    
15 In Brown (2001), nearly half of the 869 observations report that they will annuitize their DC plans.  
16 According to Yarri’s (1965) models, individuals without bequest motives should fully annuitize their 
wealth.  
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Security and pension wealth constitutes half of older American household’s wealth and 
almost 40 percent of household wealth is held in non-annuitized financial wealth. The 
proportion of non-annuitized wealth is higher in wealthier households. Brown (2000) 
explains various reasons17 why more people don’t buy annuities. The price of annuities 
during the retirement period is also an important issue. In a private annuity market with 
adverse selection, the price of an annuity at retirement should be higher than the price of 
an annuity that is bought at young age. Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky and Brown (1999) 
find that a typical retiree with average mortality prospects faces a significant cost if he 
purchases an individual annuity from a commercial insurance company, even though the 
payout value-per-premium dollar has risen from the early 1980’s to mid 1990’s. The risk 
in annuitization at retirement is essentially related to the interest rate under which pension 
wealth can be transformed into an annuity. Bodie et al. (1985, p.145) consider deferred 
life annuities at fair interest rates one of important advantages in DB plans that can be 
welfare improving and that are not available in capital market. In short, even after the 
annuitization at retirement is considered, longevity risk in DC plans still matters. 
Although there is little research on risk difference between pension types on 
retirement, some researchers have studied the effects of mortality risk and longevity risk 
on retirement. Hurd and Smith (2002) study the effect of subjective survival on 
retirement. They find that workers with a very low survival probability leave the labor 
force earlier than those with moderate or high survival probabilities. Alternatively, 
researchers have studied the effect of longevity risk can be found in macroeconomic level. 
Bloom, Canning, and Graham (2003) show that increase in life expectancy leads to 
                                                 
17 Various explanations were explored to answer the thin market for annuities: the role of adverse selection, 
administrative loading factors, bequest motives, precautionary savings, and the risk pooling within family. 
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higher saving rates at every age under a couple of assumptions18 and find empirical 
support, using a cross-country panel of national saving rates in East Asian counties. They 
find that when life expectancy increases, the effect of increased longevity on retirement 
income outweighs the effect of improved health on the length of working life. That is, 
increased longevity risk increases the need for retirement income. The need for 
retirement income boosts savings. Nishiyama and Smetters (2005) find that longevity risk 
increases labor supply and precautionary savings. They analyze the effects of simulated 
phased-in partial privatization of Social Security. According to their analysis, labor 
supply increases by 3.5 percent in the long run without perfect annuity market, and labor 
supply increases only 3.2 percent in the long run with perfect annuity markets. The 
decrease in labor supply with perfect annuity market shows the longevity risk can induce 
workers to increase their labor supply or defer retirement. Sheshinski (2004) also shows 
that longevity risk can affect the retirement timing. He suggests that optimal retirement 
age is lower with continuous annuitization (i.e., to convert savings continuously during 
the working period into annuities) than with annuitization at retirement, and that 
retirement age is lower with annuitization at retirement than without annuitization. 
Because DB plans may be continuous annuitization and that DC plans may be annuitized 
at retirement or provide a lump-sum, workers with DB plans may retire earlier than 
workers with DC plans.        
 
5. Other Factors Affecting the Retirement Decision 
In addition to pension factors mentioned above, there are several factors that 
powerfully influence workers’ retirement decisions. Prominent among these other factors 
                                                 
18 The authors assume that agents know their lifetime. The possibility of a bequest motive in saving is 
ignored. The time path of health is assumed to be exogenously fixed 
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considered in the retirement literature are the role of Social Security, employer provided 
health insurance and poor health.  
Social Security plays an important role in the retirement decision as DB plans 
(Feldstein and Liebman, 2002). Social Security will transfer income from working years 
to retirement years and this transfer will expand the budget constraints in the retirement 
period. The Social Security benefit structure alters retirement incentives since the benefits 
will be provided only after individuals retire and the present value of benefits depends on 
retirement timing. Although any individual’s Social Security benefit is adjusted 
according to the retirement timing, the adjustment is not actuarially fair enough to offset 
the total changes in the present value of benefits. There is a vast literature that attempts to 
evaluate the effects of Social Security on retirement. Diamond and Gruber (1999) use the 
March 1994 and 1995 Current Population Survey (CPS) and find that the retirement rate 
for men increased dramatically at age sixty-two, which is the age of eligibility for early 
retirement under Social Security, and at age sixty-five, which is the normal retirement 
age. Coile and Gruber (2004), using the first four waves of HRS data, show that Social 
Security wealth and forward-looking measures such as the option value and the peak 
value are important for explaining retirement behavior, while accrual variable is not.  
The substantial body of literature on health insurance and labor force participation 
includes the issue of the retirement decision. There are three main sources of health 
insurance for older individuals: employer-provided retiree health insurance, federal 
government health insurance (Medicare and Medicaid), and commercial individually 
purchased health insurance. Non-portable employer-provided health insurance tends to 
reduce job mobility, i.e., have job lock effects. This effect can affect older workers who 
are close to retirement age. If health insurance loss is costly, then insurance coverage will 
motivate continued work.  However, if employer-provided health insurance is available 
for retirees, then coverage for employer-provided health insurance does not affect the 
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retirement decision. Madrian (1994) measures the importance of “job lock” effect, i.e. the 
reduction in job mobility due to the non-portability of employer-provided health 
insurance. Using 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey (NMES) data, she finds that 
job lock reduced voluntary quit probability by 4 percentage points, from 16 percent to 12 
percent, equivalent to a 25 percent reduction in job mobility. Kapur (1998), however, 
using the same 1987 NMES data, finds that job lock effect was small and statistically 
insignificant. Madrian and Gruber (1995) estimate the effect of continuation of coverage 
provided under Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reduction Act (COBRA) of 1986 on 
retirement,19 using March Current Population Survey for the years 1980-1990 and the 
1984-1987 panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation. Their estimation 
results suggest that one year of continuation coverage raises the retirement rate by 30 
percent.  
Buchmuller and Valletta (1999) examine the effects of employer provided health 
insurance on the labor supply of married women. Since health insurance is commonly 
provided only to full time workers, spouses who prefer to work short hours, but have no 
alternative source of insurance, may work long hours in order to get coverage for their 
families. Using the April 1993 Current Population Survey (CPS) Employee Benefits 
Supplement, they analyze wives’ labor supply. Their empirical analysis employs the 
reduced form equation that includes a dummy variable representing husband’s health 
insurance. Their results show that the coefficients on husbands’ health insurance status 
and offers were significantly negative, implying that husbands’ health insurance coverage 
reduces married female labor supply. Rogowski and Karoly (2000) demonstrate that 
access to post-retirement health insurance has a large effect on retirement. Older male 
workers with retiree health insurance are about 11 percent more likely to retire than 
                                                 
19 This bill requires employers to offer continued coverage to displaced workers, albeit at full cost to the 
former worker. 
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counterparts who would lose employer-provided health insurance upon retirement. 
However, this may overestimate the true effect due to potential self-selection bias. If 
workers who expect to retire early select into jobs with retiree health benefits, then this 
would tend to bias the coefficient on retiree health insurance upward. Thus this, estimate 
may best be interpreted as an upper bound of the effects of health insurance on retirement. 
Blau and Gilleske (2003), however, suggest changes in health insurance, including access 
and restriction to retiree health insurance, have only a modest impact on the employment 
behavior of older males from their simulation using HRS data.  
The role of poor health is thought to have effects on retirement through two 
different channels – by changing the budget constraint, and preferences (Lumsdaine and 
Mitchell, 1999). Poor health has a detrimental effect on labor earnings. Many ill 
employees will be less productive in the short run, and be less likely to invest in long-
term skills in the long run. In response to lower pay, unhealthy workers might be more 
likely to leave their jobs, reduce hours, and eventually retire. Poor health can alter the 
value of peoples’ time and people’s perception of the utility of work versus leisure. 
Dwyer and Mitchell (1998) use HRS data and find a strong correlation between 
subjective physical health problems with early planned retirement. Men in poor overall 
health expected to retire one to two years earlier. This effect persists after correcting for 
potential endogeneity of self-rated health problems. However, they do not relate this 
result with the pension benefits. Since poor health can shorten life expectancy, 
individuals may want to retire early to maximize pension the benefit (Hurd and Smith, 
2002).    
The relationship between bequest motives and retirement decisions has been 
explored little. However, suppose that individuals save not only for themselves but for 
the sake of their families, bequest motives should have an influence on the individual’s 
financial decision and savings and should have some impacts on the retirement decision. 
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Munnell, Sunden, Soto, and Taylor (2003) show that intended bequests and unintended 
bequests increase as retirees receive more of their pension benefits as lump sums rather 
than as annuity payments. A probit regression20 for those aged 51-61, HRS 1992 shows 
that DC wealth as a share of total retirement wealth (DB, DC and Social Security) has 
positive significant effect (0.206 measured by marginal effect). Alternatively, a Tobit 
regression using the probability of a large bequest as dependent variable shows the same 
effect. These results imply that DC plans have some impacts on the retirement decision 
through the intended bequest motives and wealth accumulation. Hurd and Smith (2001) 
find that increases in household wealth are associated with increases in bequest 
probabilities.  
                                                 
20 The dependent variable is the indicator variable with a value of one if the household expects to leave a 
bequest of $10,000 or more, and zero if the household does not. 
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III. Model and Estimation 
1. Model  
This study extends the model used by Samwick (1998a) by adding a risk factor. A 
standard intertemporal model of consumption, {cs}, and retirement, R, is given by:  
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where {ys} is an exogenous stream of income received while working, {ps (R, α)} is a 
stream of retirement benefits that depends explicitly on the date of retirement R and risk 
factor α, δ is discount rate, r is the interest rate, and At is current wealth at time t. u (c, 0) 
means the utility from consumption before retirement and u (c, 1) means the utility from 
consumption after retirement. 
A continuous time framework is assumed that the maximand is continuous in the 
date of retirement. It is also assumed that benefits are a differentiable function. The 
Lagrangian is:  
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The first-order condition for R is: 
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Equation (4) can be rearranged as equation (5). 21 
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where λ is the shadow value of the constraint in equation (2) and can be interpreted as the 
marginal utility of wealth.  
The left side of the equation (5) is the gain in utility that result from a marginal 
decrease in the retirement date. The right side of the equation (5) is the utility value of the 
change in financial resources that results from a marginal increase in the retirement date. 
The first term in brackets is the difference between earnings and retirement benefits at 
retirement time R; this is the immediate financial incentive to delay retirement. The 
second term is the present value at retirement time R of the increase in retirement benefits 
that result from a marginal delay in the retirement date. Pension formulas that provide 
strong incentives to delay the retirement will have larger values of this term. Equation (5) 
suggests that an important consideration in the decision to retire is the increase in pension 
wealth that results when retirement is delayed.  
When pension benefits have more risks (e.g. longevity risk or investment risk) 
and the present value of pension benefits should be discounted with higher discount rate, 
                                                 
21 Since the notation in Equation (4) assumes cR is the same regardless of whether the individual is retired at 
R, the first and the third term on the right hand side of equation (4) should be deleted. The power term –r(s 
– t) in the last term on the right hand side of equation (4) is same as –r[ (R–t) – (s–R)]. 
  28
the decrease in pension benefit will increase the utility from the marginal increase in the 
retirement date.  
Comparative static shows the effect of risk factor on retirement timing R. Since 
sign R sign L
R
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2
(Varian, 1992), the sign of derivative of equation (5) shows the 
effect of risk factor on retirement timing R. 
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The first part of equation (6) [−p′(R*, α)] is positive, since p′(R*, α) is negative. 
The value of pension benefit is sum of present value of future benefits: p = PV ($1 
benefits) = ∫e− α tdt. The benefits should be discounted according to the risk, i.e., high risk 
requires high discount rate: 
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Equation (6) implies that the total effects of increased risks will delay retirement. 
So far as longevity risk is concerned, DB plans do not affect the risk factor. DC plans 
increase the longevity risk compared to DB plans, and pension benefits from DC plans 
should be discounted with higher discount factor. The decrease in pension benefits delays 
retirement.  
This study investigates how pensions affect retirement through pension wealth, 
age–related incentives, and longevity risk. First, the accumulated retirement wealth will 
tend to be different depending on whether a worker is covered by a DB plan, a DC plans, 
both or neither. As noted above, increase in pension wealth provides incentive for earlier 
retirement. However, whether DB or DC pension wealth is larger cannot be predicted a 
priori. Second, this study tests the age incentive effect of pension plans on retirement, 
using pension accruals and measures of pension option value or equivalents. Finally, this 
study also tests whether higher longevity risk will lead workers to retire later. The 
research hypothesis is that workers with DC plans will tend to retire later than workers 
with DB plans, since individuals with DC plans tend to bear more longevity risk than 
those with DB plans. 
More specifically, the model and the research questions lead to the following 
hypotheses.  
Hypothesis #1: Larger pension wealth will cause workers to retire earlier. 
Hypothesis #2: Workers with a higher option value will retire later. 
Hypothesis #3: Higher longevity risk will cause workers to retire later. 
 
In the next section, I discuss the data and estimation techniques that I use to test 
these three hypotheses. 
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2. Data and Estimation 
This study employs data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). The HRS 
is a nationally representative survey of over 7,607 households with members who were 
born between 1931 and 1941. The HRS began in 1992 and surveys participants every two 
years.22 The full HRS is comprised of 12,652 individuals, and 7,607 households. Of these, 
only 8,328 individuals who are age eligible (aged fifty-one to sixty-one in 1992) and who 
report their working or retirement status are used in the analysis. In addition, individuals 
with DB plans and DC plans are sometimes analyzed separately in order to more easily 
compare the two types of pensions.  
Various measures of retirement are considered in this study. Individuals are 
considered retired if they report in the HRS that they consider themselves retired. An 
individual’s expected retirement year is also used. Objective retirement status such as 
work hours (Friedberg and Webb, 2000) and expected probability of retirement after age 
62 may be used in panel data analysis (Chan and Stevens, 2004). 
This study employs various estimation approaches corresponding to different 
retirement measures. The first estimation method is the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression of the expected retirement year. The dependent variable is an individual’s 
expected retirement year as reported at the time of the first wave survey. In this 
estimation, the sample is reduced to the workers who reported that they were not fully 
retired in the first wave, since only they were asked to answer the expected retirement 
year.     
The second method of analysis is a probit regression model. Many of retirement 
models estimate the probability of retirement in year t by comparing the observed 
                                                 
22 Respondents are surveyed in even years regarding household variables in odd years.  That is, the 1992 
wave is a survey of household status in 1991. 
  31
retirement behavior in a sample of workers with the value of a function of their economic 
characteristics. The most straightforward and frequently used example is a probit model 
or logit model. A standard specification of retirement is;  
Pr [Retire in year t] = Pr [Xβ + ε  > 0],  
where X is the vector of explanatory variables. Assuming that ε has a normal distribution, 
this is a probit formulation. The dependent variable in the probit regression model is a 
dummy variable for retirement. If a respondent reports he or she is retired in a specific 
year, then this dummy variable takes a value of one, otherwise, the value is zero. 
Alternatively respondents may be defined as retired when they report as working at wave 
time t, but report as retired at wave time t+1.  
A multinomial logit regression approach is also used. The reason for using this 
technique is that since many workers often retire in phases, the partial and full retirement 
need to be defined separately. This study uses the three-alternative version, i.e., an 
individual faces a three-way choice: (1) retiring fully, (2) retiring partially/ working part-
time or (3) working full-time. The three choices are assumed to be unordered.23 Suppose 
each individual i faces J choices, and has random utilities corresponding to each choice: 
Uij = x'ij β + εij, i = 0, 1, 2,..., J, , where x is a vector of exogenous variables and β is a 
vector of corresponding coefficients to be estimated, and ε is a random shock to utility. If 
the individual chooses j, then Uij is assumed to be the maximum among the J utilities: 
Prob (Uij > Uik) for all other k ≠ j. Let Yi be a random variable that indicates the choice. If 
the J disturbances are independent and identically distributed with F(εij) = exp(−exp(εij)), 
                                                 
23 If three alternatives are assumed be ordered such as bond rating, then ordered logit or ordered probit 
analysis may be used. To use the ordered logit/ probit analysis, the equal slope assumption should be hold. 
When this assumption is not met, the estimates of ordered logit/probit analysis will be biased. However, the 
multinomial analysis is applied to the ordered choices, the estimates is unbiased, even though those 
estimates are inefficient.  
  32
then Prob (Y = j) = exp (x'ij β)/ Σj=1J exp(x'ij β), which is a multinomial logit model 
(Greene, 2003).24 The binomial logit model is the special case of J = #2. A interpretation 
of β is given by Prob(Y=j)/ Prob(Y=0) = exp (x'ij β), j = 1, 2,…, J. Equivalently, the log-
odds ratio is linear in x: log [Prob(Y=j)/ Prob(Y=0)] = x βj (Wooldrige, 2002, p. 498). 
Finally, this study uses “time-to-retirement” as the dependent variable, and 
applies a survival analysis (or duration analysis).25  Under the survival model,26  T is 
assumed be continuous random variable with probability density function f(t) and 
cumulative distribution function F(t) = P(T ≤  t), giving the probability that the event of 
retirement has occurred by duration t. Similarly, the complement of F, the survival 
function, can be defined as: S (t) = P(T > t) = 1−F(t) = ∫t∞f(x)dx, which gives the 
probability of being “alive,” in this study “working,” at time t. Then, the hazard function 
is expressed as: λ(t) = f(t)/ S(t). For each t, λ(t) is the instantaneous rate of occurrence of 
the event or of leaving per unit of time. In other words, the hazard at duration t equals the 
ratio between the density of the event at t and the probability of surviving by that duration 
without experiencing the event. Finally, from the definitions given above, the following 
relationships hold: λ(t) = − d log S(t)/ dt, and  S(t) = exp(−∫t∞ λ(x)dx).  
The distribution of T can be characterized equivalently both in terms of the 
survival and the hazard function. However, the shape of hazard function is of primary 
interest in many empirical applications. When the hazard function is constant, λ(t) = λ. A 
constant hazard implies survival function S(t) = 1 − exp(−λt), which is the cumulative 
density function of exponential distribution. When the hazard function is not constant, the 
                                                 
24 When data are individual specific, this model is called multinomial logit model. More generally, x may 
include the attributes of the choices, and then the model is called the conditional logit model (Greene, 2003, 
p.720).  
25 Hausman and Wise (1985) seminally applied the survival analysis to retirement model.   
26 The descriptions of the survival analysis in this study are based on chapter 20 in Wooldrige (2002) and 
chapter 22 in Greene (2003). 
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process is said to exhibit duration dependence. Assuming λ(⋅) is differentiable, there is 
positive duration dependence at time t if dλ(t)/dt > 0. With positive duration dependence, 
the probability of exiting the initial state increases the longer one is in the initial state 
(Wooldridge, 2002, p.689). The event of interest in this study is retirement, so it is natural 
to assume that the probability of retiring increases as an individual works longer. Thereby, 
positive duration dependence in a hazard function is expected in this study. Various 
distributions capture the positive duration dependence: e.g. a Weilbull distribution, a log-
logistic hazard function. If T has a Weibull distribution, its cumulative density function is 
given by F(t) = 1 − exp (−γtα), where γ and α are nonnegative parameters. The hazard 
function is λ(t) =  γαtα-1. If α >1, the hazard function is monotonically increasing, so 
hazard exhibits positive duration dependence. The likelihood of failure (in this study, 
retirement) at time t, conditional on the duration up to time t, is increasing in t. 
Alternatively, if we assume that hazard increases until a specific point, and then it 
decreases, then other hazard function such as log-logistic hazard function is preferable. 
Considering that retirement rates are higher around a specific age, i.e., age 60-62, the 
curved hazard function may be better than monotonically increasing hazard function. The 
log-logistic hazard function is specified as λ(t) =  γαtα-1/ (1 + γαtα-1), where γ and α are 
positive parameters. When α = 1, the hazard is monotonically decreasing from γ at to 
zero as t Æ ∞; when α < 1,  the hazard is also monotonically decreasing to zero as t Æ ∞; 
but hazard is unbounded as t approaches zero. When α > 1, the hazard is increasing until t 
= [(α −1)/γ]1− α, and then it decrease to zero. 27 
                                                 
27 The log-logistic regression is one of the accelerated failure time (AFT) model. In this model, the natural 
logarithm of the survival time ln t is expressed as a linear function of the covariates: ln t = xβ + ε, where x 
is a vector of covariates and β is a vector of regression coefficient. The Weibull regression can be 
expressed as AFT model or the proportional hazard rate (PH) model. In the PH model, the covariates have 
a multiplicative effect on the hazard function: h(t) = h0(t)g(xβ) + ε, where h0(t) is the baseline hazard 
function and g(xβ) is a nonnegative function of the covariates. 
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The hazard function indicates the probability that a person who is working up to 
time t, retire between time t and t+1. For example, if T is the time to retire, measured in 
months, then λ (35) is (approximately) the probability of retiring between months 35 and 
36. This also means that the person was working up to through month 35. That is, λ(35) 
is roughly the probability of retiring between months 35 to 36, conditional on working 
through month 35. One of difficult part in using survival analysis is to specify the hazard 
function. However, the Cox regression technique provides a method for estimating the 
parameters in a proportional hazard rate model without specifying the baseline hazard 
function. A proportional hazard function models comprise an important class of survival 
models. A proportional hazard can be expressed as follows: λ(t,x) = κ(x)λ0(t), where 
κ(⋅)>0 is a nonnegative function of x and λ0(t) > 0 is called baseline hazard. The baseline 
hazard is common to all units in the population, and is calculated when all independent 
variable is zero. κ(⋅) is parameterized as κ(x) = exp (xβ), where β is a vector of 
parameters. Then log λ(t,x) = xβ + log λ0(t), and therefore βj measures the semi elasticity 
of the hazard with respect to xj. 
This study uses HRS data from 1992 -2002, and the individuals who are still 
working in the 2002 data are censored. In this study, the duration is measured by time to 
retire: difference measured in month between January and the reported time to retire. 
 
3. Variables 
Among the important independent variables are pension type dummies, pension 
wealth, and pension option values. Pension wealth is expected to have positive 
coefficients in the retirement equation. If a worker is covered by pension, the pension 
coverage dummy is one, otherwise zero. The pension coverage will increase the 
retirement wealth, so the expected sign of coefficient is positive. If a worker has one or 
more DC plans, then the DC dummy equals one. If a worker has DB plans, then the DB 
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dummy equals one. The self-reported pension types are used, since individuals are 
expected to respond to their beliefs although the beliefs may be incorrect.  This study 
uses pension values provided by the HRS.  
The “option value” of continued work has been used as a measure of the utility 
incentive to continue working. The option value model was originally developed by 
Stock and Wise (1990) and modified by other researchers (Coile and Gruber (2000), 
Gustman and Steinmeier (2001)). The option value is the difference between the lifetime 
utility associated with retiring at the optimal retirement date, R*, and that associated with 
retirement at time t: Gt (R*) = EV(R*) – EV(t). Workers should continue to work so long 
as the option value is positive, and should retire when the option value changes from 
positive to zero. Empirically, the greater the option value means the lower the probability 
of retirement at time t. The option value of retirement can be calculated based on 
assumed parameter values and used as an explanatory variable. In year t, the option value 
calculation for each individual who is age a is: 
G t (R*)  =  Σ s = t R*-1 δ s-t π (s|t) E t (ys γ) + Σ s = R∗ T δ s-t π (s|t) E t [kps (R*)]γ  
               − Σ  s = t T δ s-t π (s|t) E t [kps (R*)]γ       (8)  
In this expression, δ is a discount factor, γ is a parameter of relative risk aversion, π (s|t) 
is the probability of someone age a in year t surviving to year s, and the expectation 
operator, E (.), denotes expected value of future income {ys} and retirement benefit 
streams {ps (R)}, with the latter conditional on retirement year R. R* is the optimal 
retirement date determined by considering all possible dates between t and T and 
selecting the one that maximizes the right-hand side of the equation. A factor k (k >1) 
means that the added leisure during retirement increase utility, since retirement benefits 
are obtained without work. A value of γ (γ <1) implies that the individual would prefer 
that a given present value of income and benefits be distributed evenly all years. Stock 
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and Wise (1990) estimated the parameters of the option value model, and estimated γ and 
k of 0.63 and 1.25, respectively. Samwick (1998) used 0.75 for γ and 1.5 for k. 
Coile and Gruber (2000) note that the major source of variation in the option 
value is the variation in wages. They argue that this might pose problems for the 
estimation of the impact of Social Security policy. To address this potential shortcoming 
with the option value model, they propose a “peak value,” a new forward-looking 
measure of incentives. Peak value is comparable to the accrual, but looks forward more 
than just one year: Peak value calculates the difference between Social Security wealth at 
its maximum expected value and Social Security wealth at today’s value, to measure the 
incentive to continued work. Since wages are not included specifically into the peak 
value calculation, peak value can focus on the variation from the structure of the Social 
Security entitlement rather than differences in wages.    
PKV t (R*) = Σ s = R∗ T δ s-t π (s|t) E t [ps (R*)] − Σ  s = t T δ s-t π (s|t) E t [ps (t)]              (9) 
Samwick (2001) shows that peak value is equivalent to the option value under a 
set of parameter restrictions. The first restriction is that the first term [Σ s = t R*-1 δ s-t π (s|t) 
E t (ys γ)] in option value equation (8), pertaining to future earnings, is dropped. The 
present value of earnings through the optimal retirement age is asked to be included in 
the regression. The optimal retirement date, R*, may change when the present value of 
future earnings is dropped from the option value to get peak value. The second restriction 
is that k equals unity, implying that there is no disutility of working relative to being 
retired. This restriction may be seen counterintuitive, but if peak value compares income 
flows only during the retirement, this assumption is admissible. The third restriction is 
that γ equals unity, implying that workers are indifferent to whether income and 
retirement benefit payments vary across years. This restriction is less critical, since the 
peak value calculation pertains to annuity income from Social Security and DB plans.  
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Gustman and Steinmeier (2001) propose the premium value as an alternative to 
option value. The well-used option value does not capture the potential of a future extra 
bonus on top of any current accruals. For example, the option value would increase more 
or less indefinitely for the DC plans, and yet these plans in general are not perceived to 
provide a strong incentive to retire at any particular time. For this reason they introduce a 
new measure of future incentives which they call premium value. The premium value is 
defined as the difference between the present value of the future benefit stream and the 
present value of a stream of benefits equal each year to the value of the basic level of 
accrual initially observed for the plan. To calculate this value, for each year they calculate 
the value of the pension and compare it to the value the pension would have if the current 
accruals were to continue until the future year. The premium value is the maximum of the 
present value of these differences. A DC plan which increases steadily in value will have 
zero value, since there are no future benefits that are not evident in the current accrual 
rate. They point that the peak value proposed by Coile and Gruber (2000) counts all 
increases in benefits with continued work, and thus peak value continues to increase in 
time as benefits are accumulated in DC plans, while the premium value does not. The 
peak value is the difference between the maximum pension value and the current pension 
value, while the premium value is the difference between then maximum pension value 
and the pension value that would be if current accruals remain constant. While the option 
value has conceptual advantages, the calculation of option value requires a specification 
of a utility function and estimation of many parameters. That is, the option value is 
expressed in utility, while the peak value and the premium value are expressed in dollar 
amounts. Despite their conceptual disadvantages, the peak value and the premium value 
are more convenient in the sense that they do not require strong assumptions regarding 
the form of the utility function.  
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The option value in this study is defined as the difference between the maximum 
pension values at various ages and the current pension values. This calculation assumes 
an interest rate of 6.3%, a wage growth of 5%, and an inflation rate of 4%.28 The values 
of these rates are the intermediate long-term rates forecast by the Social Security 
Administration as of the mid-1990s. 
The starting point to study longevity risk empirically is how to measure this risk.  
Longevity risk is defined as the risk that one will live beyond one’s expected life span 
and thus run out of money. The longevity risk depends on various factors such as age, 
retirement time, life expectancy, consumption and wealth (including Social Security 
wealth and pension wealth). To measure the longevity risk, all of these factors should be 
considered. One way is to include these factors in the regression equation. However, 
simple linear combinations of the related variables may not capture the interaction effects 
of these factors.  
This study uses the annuity equivalent wealth to consider the interaction effects of 
the factors that affect longevity risk. A life annuity removes the risk of outliving one’s 
resources. Without access to annuities in retirement, a retiree should reduce his 
consumption level in order to ensure that he will not run out of money. Assuming a well-
functioning annuity market, annuities provide for higher levels of income than one could 
receive in the absence of annuities, in exchange for making the receipt of this income 
contingent upon living. Since the value of annuity equivalent wealth depends on 
longevity risk, it can be used as proxy value for longevity risk. Yaari’s (1965) life-cycle 
model without loading factors, bequests, or other non-mortality sources of uncertainty 
indicates that everyone has utility gains from annuitization. The magnitude of these 
                                                 
28 Pension wealth values are based on the results calculated by Bob Peticolas and Thomas Steinmeier. This 
data set is one of HRS researchers’ contribution data set. These values are the intermediate long-term rates 
forecast by the Social Security Administration as of the mid -1990s. 
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utility gains, the annuity equivalent wealth, however, may vary greatly across individuals 
based on the behavioral and economic parameters that we assume. For example, more 
risk averse individuals will have a higher valuation of annuities than less risk averse 
individuals. The annuity equivalent wealth (AEW) measures the increase in utility 
resulting from access to fair annuities in terms of dollars. The value of increase in wealth 
equals the additional wealth we must give a person in the absence of annuitization to 
keep the person on the same expected utility curve as if we provided actuarially fair 
annuity markets for the individual. The annuity equivalent wealth measure captures the 
maximum mark-up over the actuarially fair cost that an individual would be willing to 
pay (Brown, 2001).  
Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) show that the percentage increase in initial wealth 
required to obtain the utility level with fair annuities, that is, the annuity equivalent 
wealth, can be calculated by solving the following equation:   
H0 (MW0) = V0 (W0),  
where M is the annuity equivalent wealth, W0 is initial wealth, and H and V are the 
indirect utility functions for the no-annuity and annuity case, respectively.    
Assuming that individuals exhibit the constant relative risk aversion, that is, 
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where T is the maximum longevity or the terminal period, δ is the discount rate; π (s|t) is 
the probability of someone age a in year t surviving to year s;  r is the interest rate; γ is 
the constant relative risk-aversion parameters. As the above formula shows, for the 
constant relative risk aversion case the annuity equivalent wealth is independent of the 
initial level of wealth.  
Brown (2001) improved the annuity equivalent wealth measure by incorporating 
the amount of wealth that is already previously annuitized by Social Security and DB 
plans. He added the level of the pre-annuitized wealth to the model. While it is possible 
to derive a solution analytically in the Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) model, the presence 
of pre-existing annuities requires numerical methods. The annuity equivalent wealth 
should be smaller when a person has more annuitized wealth in the form of a defined 
benefit pension or Social Security benefits. 
AEW in this study is calculated on the same assumption as in the pension value 
calculation and one additional assumption: R (one plus interest rate) × δ (time preference 
parameter) = 1. For the calculation of AEW, age, sex, the degree of relative risk aversion 
and the proportion of pre-annuitized wealth are used. Two methods of AEW calculation 
are employed: Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981), and Brown (2001). Since Brown (2001)’s 
method considers the proportion of pre-annuitized wealth, i.e., the effect of portion of DB 
pension wealth, I use this method mainly in the estimation. However, Kotlikoff and 
Spivak’s (1981) method can calculate AEW analytically, and so is more convenient to 
compute. I use Kotlikoff and Spivak’s AEW method for comparison with Brown’s 
(2001) method.  
The coefficient of relative risk aversion for AEW calculation is based on answers 
to the two subsequent survey questions on job choices (Question L14, L14a and L14b in 
                                                                                                                                                 
29 The notation is changed for consistency. 
  41
the first wave HRS, See Appendix 1). Based on answers to these questions, the sample 
may be divided into four groups. These groups can be ranked in terms of their risk 
aversion. Assuming that individuals have a constant relative risk aversion utility function, 
it is possible to put specific bounds on the value of risk aversion by solving the following 
inequality:  
0.5 U (2c) + 0.5 U (λc) > U (c),  
where U is the utility function, c is consumption, and λ is the fraction of potential income 
reduction (Barsky, Juster, Kimball and Shapiro, 1997). For example, the coefficient of 
relative risk aversion for the group who rejected one-third, but accept one-fifth can be 
calculated by solving two inequalities:   
0.5 U (2c) + 0.5 U (0.8c) ≥ U (c) and U (c) ≥ 0.5 U (2c) + 0.5 U (2/3c)   
The upper bound and the lower bound of this group is 3.76 and 2, respectively. Barsky et 
al. (1997) estimated the mean value of each group to be 0.7, 1.5, 2.9 and 15.8. 30 The 
values used here are the mean values of each group, but since the mean value of the most 
risk averse group seems to be too high, the coefficient of that group is changed from 15.8 
to 5.0 in the manner following Brown (2001). 31  
The process to estimate the AEW value follows Brown (2001). The AEW 
calculation proceeds in two steps. In the first step, the individual is assumed to have 
access to actuarially fair, real annuity markets and to fully annuitize the starting wealth 
                                                 
30 Kimball, Sham, and Shapiro (2005) explain how to estimate the mean value of relative risk aversion in 
detail.  
31 Lower/ upper bound and mean value for each group 
 Lower bound Upper bound Value used 
1. Reject both 1/3 and 1/5  3.76 ∞ 5.0 
2. Reject 1/3, accept 1/5 2.00 3.76 2.9 
3. Accept 1/3, reject 1/2 1.00 2.00 1.5 
4. Accept both 1/3 and 1/2 0 1.00 0.7 
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W0, attaining the maximum utility V*. The second step is to find the additional wealth 
∆W, which must be given to the individual to achieve the same utility level as V* when 
annuities are not available. If V (W0+∆W) = V*, then AEW is defined as (W0 + ∆W)/W0.  
The use of dynamic programming methods is necessary to solve for optimal 
consumption paths in multi-period, stochastic life-cycle model. Let U(ct) be the utility 
function, δ the utility discount rate, and T the maximum possible life-span of an 
individual. Then the consumer’s problem is:  
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where the expression Et [.] is taken over states of survival. The objective function is 
subject to the following constraints:  
(i)  W0 given 
(ii)  Wt ≥ 0 for all t,  
(iii) Wt+1 = (Wt − Ct + St + At ) (1+r)                (12) 
In these constraints, Wt is non-annuitized wealth in period t, Ct is consumption, St 
is the pre-existing annuity payment form Social Security and DB pensions, At is the fair 
annuity payment that can be purchased in annuity market. Assume that the individual has 
financial wealth W*. For the case where no annuities are available, W0 = W*, and At = 0 
for all t. In order to use dynamic programming techniques, it is useful to introduce a value 
function Vt(Wt), which is defined as:  
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subject to the constraints in equations (14). The value function at time t is the present 
value of expected utility evaluated along the optimal path. This value function satisfies 
the following recursive Bellman equations: 
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where qt+1 is the probability of dying before period t+2 conditional on surviving to period 
t+1, i.e., qt+1 = 1 − π (t+2|t+1).32 Numerical methods are required because of the presence 
of pre-existing annuities. The AEW calculation proceeds in two steps. In the first step, 
the individual is assumed to have access to actuarially fair, real annuity markets and to 
fully annuitize the starting wealth W0, attaining the maximum utility V*. The second step 
is to find the additional wealth ∆W, which must be given to the individual to achieve the 
same utility level as V* when annuities are not available. That is, if V(W*+∆W| At =0) = 
V*, then AEW is defined as (W* + ∆W)/W*. 
Health and health insurance related variables are reported to have significant 
effects on retirement decisions. If reported respondent’s health is fair or poor, the poor 
health dummy is one, otherwise zero. A healthy worker tends to retire later, and so the 
expected sign on this dummy is positive. Many researchers find that employer-provided 
health insurance has job lock effect. The presence of the health insurance is expected to 
delay retirement, whereas a retiree health insurance program would induce early 
retirement.  
Other control variables include demographic variables (age, education, sex, 
marital status, number of children, and a dummy variable for young children age 17 or 
                                                 
32 Life table of year 2000 from Social Security Administration is used. 
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less), health and health insurance variables, and wealth and income related variables. Age 
will increase the probability of retirement, and so a positive coefficient is expected. 
Although the effect of education on retirement is not as clear as age, previous studies 
show that education has delaying effects on retirement. If education influences the wage 
or income, then the increased wage or income will explain the negative coefficient. The 
effect of gender is not clear. Married people were estimated to retire later in some studies 
(i.e. Samwick, 1998a). The marriage status dummy is one when a respondent is currently 
married. Divorced or widowed are classified into zero. Since parents have to work more 
to support their children, but parents can rely on their children during the retirement 
period, the effect of number of children is not clear. Young children are expected to delay 
the retirement timing of their parents. Dummy variables for industry and occupation are 
also included in the regressions. Two indicator variables are added to control for the 
bequest motive: High probabilities of leaving bequest and the high importance of 
bequest. A dummy variable myopic equals one if the individual states that his or her time 
horizon for financial planning is one year or less, and zero otherwise. 
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IV. Results 
1. Descriptive Statistics 
This section presents the estimation results, starting with the descriptive statistics. 
Table 1 compares means and standard deviations of the variables of workers with 
different types of pensions for the sub-samples of HRS participants used in this study. 
The average age of survey participants in the sample is 55.9 years, and females comprise 
50.8 percent of the sample population. The average education level is 12.3 years (high 
school diploma), with a minimum of zero year and a maximum of 17 years. Over half the 
workers (63.7 percent) reported that they have an employer-provided retirement plans: 
49.6 percent are covered by only the DB plans; 24.6 percent are covered by only the DC 
plans, and 25.8 percent have both DB plans and DC plans.33  
The summary statistics indicate that workers with different types of retirement 
plans have important differences in the level of pension wealth, job characteristics and 
AEW value. First, pension wealth differs across plans. Workers with both types of 
pensions have the highest value of pension wealth, with a mean value of $148,000 in 
1992. The means value of pension wealth in DB plans is $130,000. This figure is two 
times higher than the value of DC pension wealth ($48,000). Second, Job tenure of 
workers with DB plans is longer than that of workers with DC plans (16.9 years and 13.6 
years, respectively). Of those reporting DB only coverage, about 38.8 percent are in 
professional or related services or public administration. 34  In addition, for 1992 the 
                                                 
33 This figure is somewhat different from those based on company data, since the HRS did not obtain the 
data on many of respondents who have pension plans and many of respondents misunderstood the nature of 
their own pension plans. 
34 Friedberg and Webb (2003) reported that 55 percent of individuals with only DB plans are employed in 
professional or related services or public administration, however their sample does not include self-
employed. 
  46
average earnings of workers with DC plans are $29,000, which is approximately 10 
percent higher than the average earnings of $26,000 for workers with DB plans. Finally, 
on average, individuals in the sample have an annuity equivalent wealth of 1.30, implying 
that they would be indifferent between $1 of annuitized wealth and $1.30 of non-
annuitized wealth. Individuals with DC have an AEW value of 1.32. This value is 
significantly higher the average AEW value of 1.26 for individuals with DB plans. This 
difference reflects the intuition that DB plans provide a life annuity, and thus reduce 
longevity risk. 
Table 2 shows the change in self-reported retirement status. In the first year, 21.0 
percent of individuals considered themselves retired, and during the following ten years, 
more than half of individuals retired by the sixth wave of the survey. Among 6,578 
workers working full time in the first wave, 25.5 percent of workers still consider 
themselves not retired in the sixth wave of the survey.  
 
2. Regression Analysis 
Table 3 shows the results of the expected retirement year regression. This OLS 
regression uses the self-reported pension types, since the dependent variable is the 
expected retirement year, and the retirement decision depends much on individuals’ 
perception. In regression 1 (Table 3, column 1), I use age, gender, a relative risk aversion 
factor and the proportion of pre-annuitized wealth as explanatory variables. In regression 
2 (Table 3, column 2), I include a longevity risk measure that is a function of these 
variables. I find that workers with DB plans expect to retire later than workers with DC 
plans. Interestingly, workers with DC plans expect to retire later than workers without 
pensions. This may appear counter-intuitive; however, considering that the assets in DC 
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plans cannot be withdrawn penalty-free until age 59½, this result may be reasonable.35 
The pension option value, measured as the difference between the pension value in 1992 
and the maximum pension value among pension values at different ages, is not 
significant. Pension wealth is also insignificant. Both variables, though, have the 
expected sign. Non-pension wealth decreases the retirement age at which individuals 
expect to retire. Earnings are insignificant in the regression of expected retirement year. 
The coefficient of age is negative and significant, indicating that a one year older 
individual expects to retire early by about eight months. Females expect to retire earlier 
than males by nine months. The relative risk aversion measure is not significant, but pre-
annuitized wealth reduces the expected age of retirement. Specifically, a ten percent point 
increase in pre-annuitized wealth leads to a two month decrease in expected age of 
retirement, implying that workers with more wealth accumulated in DB plans expect to 
retire earlier. As expected, individuals who think they have a low probability of living 
after age 75 expect to retire early by approximately six months. Since late retirement 
reduces the period during which individuals receive pension benefits, persons who do not 
expect to live long prefer to retire early. Bad health as measured by self-estimation also 
has a negative impact on the expected age of retirement. The effects of pension wealth 
and pension option values are consistent with previous literature, and the effect of 
longevity risk is also compatible with predictions, even though there was no previous 
empirical research testing the effect of longevity risk.  
Employer provided health insurance has a positive effect on the expected 
retirement year, since the loss of health insurance increases the cost of retirement. The 
coefficient on retiree health insurance is negative. Individuals with children 17 years old 
                                                 
35 The additional tax on early distributions does not apply in the case of death, disability, or termination of 
employment after age 55. Exceptions also are granted for some specified cases (Allen et al. (2003), pp.506-
507). 
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or younger expect to retire about a half year later. However, the coefficient on the 
number of children is not significant. Persons who believe they have a high probability of 
high bequests expect to retire early. The value that individuals put on the bequest is not 
significant.  Highly educated and white persons expect to retire later, while married 
persons, U.S.-born persons, and myopic persons expect to retire early. Self-employed, 
skilled workers and semi-skilled workers expected to retire later, while long tenured 
workers expect to retire early.  
The second set of results in table 3 (regression 2) incorporates the longevity risk 
measure (AEW). This regression leaves out gender, the risk aversion measure and the 
proportion of pre-annuitized wealth because these variables are used to calculate the 
AEW. Age is added to the regression to control for the effect of age separately. The 
coefficient of AEW is significant and positive, implying that persons with higher 
longevity risk expect to retire later. A ten percent point increase in AEW increases the 
expected age of retirement by five months. The large coefficient on AEW should be 
interpreted with consideration of the range of AEW. The range of AEW in the sample is 
approximately 50%, so the effect of AEW could range up to two years. The elasticity36 at 
mean value of AEW is 0.887, implying that 10% increase in AEW from its mean value 
(1.30) will induce 8.87% or 8.2 months ((= 5.29*1.30*.1*12)) delay in expected time to 
retire or expected retirement age (mean value of expected retirement age 63.4). 
To examine the different effects of DB plans and DC plans, separate regressions 
are conducted on the two different types of pensions. The results of the regressions are 
located in table 4. Regression 1 shows that DC plans increase the retirement age by 0.7 
year compared to DB plans. The AEW in the DB plans sample (regression 2) is less 
significant, reflecting that the DB plans provide a life annuity, and thus reduce longevity 
                                                 
36 Elasticity gives the percentage change in the dependent variable that results from a 1% change in the 
explanatory variable. 
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risk. The coefficient of the dummy variable for a perceived low probability of living past 
age 75 is negative, implying that person who expects to have a short life expectancy 
retires earlier to collect more pension benefits. In the DC plan group, the longevity risk 
variable has a significantly positive effect on the expected retirement age. The longevity 
risk matters more in DC plans. The dummy variable for low probability of living over age 
75 is insignificant.  
Table 5 presents the results of the probit regression model where the self reported 
retirement status is the dependent variable. When workers reported they retired in 1992, 
the dependent variable is one, and it is zero otherwise. A positive coefficient in this 
regression indicates a higher probability of retirement. Overall, the probit regressions 
confirm the findings of the OLS regressions. DC plans decrease the probability of 
retirement, while DB plans do not affect the probability of retirement. Having a DC plan 
reduces the probability of retirement relative to not having a pension or having DB plans. 
The pension option value significantly decreases the probability of retirement, suggesting 
that the value of pension option plays a role in an individual’s decision to retire. 
Moreover, pension wealth has significantly positive impacts on the probability of 
retirement, while non-pension wealth is not significant. Considering that pension wealth 
in DC plans is about half of the pension wealth in DB plans, workers with DC plans retire 
later than workers with DB plans. The probit analysis confirms the hypothesis that 
pension wealth increases the probability of retirement and the hypothesis that lager 
pension option value decreases the probability of retirement. High earnings significantly 
reduce the probability of retirement.37  
                                                 
37 Earnings information on retired workers is not available in the public data set. Accordingly, in this probit 
estimation, household income is used as a proxy for earnings. The earnings from an individual’s last job 
may not be suitable, since the timing of retirement is so diverse. For the same reason, tenure, industry, and 
occupation are obtained from each individual’s occupation of the longest reported tenure.  
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Longevity risk has a negative impact on the probability of retirement, consistent 
with expectation. A ten percentage increase in AEW increases the odds of delaying 
retirement by 1.5 percent. The negative coefficient of pre-annuitized wealth, however, is 
inconsistent with expectation. A self-perceived low probability of living past age 75 has a 
positive effect on retirement probability. Risk averse persons tend to retire later. Poor 
health status increases the probability of retirement. Age is significantly and positively 
related to the probability of retirement.  
Employer provided health insurance has a negative effect on the probability of 
retirement, which is consistent with the result of the expected retirement age regression. 
Retiree health insurance increases the probability of retirement. The number of children 
an individual has increases the retirement probability. Children can also reduce longevity 
risk by providing financial or other support during the retirement period, so the positive 
coefficient on the number of children may be reasonable. Young children reduce the 
probability of retirement, implying that parents tend to delay their retirement until their 
children become independent. A dummy variable for a high bequest probability has a 
positive sign, indicating that an individual’s value of bequest has an effect on the 
retirement decision. Among the demographic variables, the number of years of education, 
the number of tenure, and being born in the U.S. increase the probability of retirement.  
Table 6 provides the estimation results of the multinomial logit regressions. The 
dependent variable is self-reported retirement status. Full retirement has the value of two, 
partial retirement the value of one, and no retirement equals zero. A positive coefficient 
in this multinomial logit regression indicates a higher probability of each type of 
retirement. The presence of DC plans has a negative effect on the probability of full 
retirement. Specifically, DC plans reduce the log-odds between full retirement status and 
working status by 0.578. The pension option value has a negative effect on the 
probability of partial and full retirement. Pension wealth has a positive effect on the 
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probability of full retirement, while non-pension wealth is significant in the partial 
retirement regression. High earnings reduce the probability of retirement.  
A perceived low probability of survival past age 75 has a positive effect on the 
probability of retirement. Pre-annuitized wealth has a negative coefficient contrary to 
what is predicted by the theoretical model, but it is insignificant. In the second 
specification, Longevity risk has a negative effect on the probability of full retirement. 
Poor health condition increases the probability of full retirement.  
Health insurance and health status have the same results as probit specifications. 
Employer provided health insurance decreases the probability of full retirement, while 
retiree health insurance increases the probability of full retirement as predicted. The 
number of children increases the probability of partial retirement. Young children reduce 
the probability of the partial retirement. Interestingly, the variables related to children are 
insignificant in the full retirement regression. A dummy variable for bequest importance 
has a negative coefficient, suggesting that those who place a high value on bequests try to 
accumulate wealth by postponing retirement. A dummy variable for a high bequest 
probability has a positive sign. The positive sign on high bequest probability indicates 
that individuals who think they accumulate enough wealth can retire earlier. Individuals 
who have a relatively high education and individuals who were born in the U.S. have a 
higher probability of full retirement. The myopic dummy variable has a positive effect on 
retirement probability, i.e., those who have short-term view in financial planning tend to 
retire early. Individuals who have long job tenure also have a higher probability of full 
retirement. 
Table 7 shows the results of the probit regressions in which workers are defined 
as retired when they reported they worked in the first wave but retired in the following 
wave. The samples are restricted to the individuals who were reported as working in the 
first wave. The coefficient of DB pension dummy variable is positive. Pension option 
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value has a negative effect on the probability of retirement while pension wealth has a 
positive effect on the probability of retirement. The coefficient of earnings is negative 
and significant. Risk aversion reduces the probability of retirement, but pre-annuitized 
wealth increases the probability of retirement. The combined longevity risk variable, 
AEW, is not significant. Poor health increases the probability of retirement.  
Health insurance has the same effects as before. Employer provided health 
insurance reduces the probability of retirement, while a retiree health insurance program 
increases it. Young children reduce the probability of retirement. Variables related to 
bequest motives are not significant in these analyses. Individuals who were born in the 
U.S. and individuals who have longer tenure have a higher full retirement probability.  
Table 8 repeats the multinomial logit regression analysis with the sample of 
persons who were working in the first wave. The dependent variable equals one if an 
individual was working in the first wave but retired in the following wave. DB plans 
increase the probability of full retirement. Pension option value decreases the probability 
of retirement. Pension wealth increases the probability of retirement, and non-pension 
wealth also has a positive effect on the full retirement probability. High earnings reduce 
the probability of retirement. A relatively higher level of risk aversion reduces the 
probability of retirement and pre-annuitized wealth increases the probability of 
retirement. The combined longevity risk variable, AEW, is not significant. The self-
estimated probability of living after age 75 is also not significant.  
Health insurance has a similar effect as in the previous analyses. Employer 
provided health insurance reduces the probability of retirement, while retiree health 
insurance increases the probability of retirement. Having young children in the family 
reduces the probability of retirement. The other bequest motive variables are not 
significant. Self-employed workers and worker born in the U.S. retire later, and workers 
with long tenure retire earlier. 
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Table 9 shows the results from the survival analysis. Here the duration is the time 
to retire, in months. Although the duration is rounded to the nearest month, it is treated as 
a continuous variable with Weibull distribution. The focus is on how certain covariates 
affect the hazard function for retirement, and also whether there is positive or negative 
duration dependence. The variables – pension wealth, pension option value, and AEW 
are of particular interest. In the duration analysis, the dependent variable is time to retire 
measured by month. This analysis is similar to the OLS regression (Table3) in the sense 
that both analyses use the time to retirement. But time to retire in OLS is the expected 
one and is not censored, while time to retire in duration analysis is actual one and right 
censored. Time to retire in the duration analysis is measured by month, so this variable 
can capture the variations in retirement in the sample better than the time to retire in OLS 
analysis measured in year.    
The hazard function with Weibull distribution is λ(t) =  γαtα-1. The estimate of α 
is 1.073 and standard error of α (.0224) leads to rejection of the null hypothesis that α =1, 
implying that there is positive duration dependence, conditional on covariates. This 
means that, for a particular working person, the instantaneous rate of retiring increases 
with the length of time in working. After 50 months, an individual is 1.125 times more 
likely to retire per month than after ten months ((50/10)1.073-1). Based on common sense 
on retirement, we would expect this positive duration dependency. However, considering 
that retirement rates are higher around a specific age, i.e., age 60-62, the curved hazard 
function with log-logistic distribution, lognormal distribution or general gamma 
distribution may be better than monotonically increasing hazard function. Because 
average age of the sample is 56, the peaks of hazard function from lognormal or 
generalized gamma distribution are too early (Figure 4). Thereby, log-logistic hazard 
function seems to be better than hazard functions with lognormal or generalized gamma 
distribution.  
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A generalized gamma model is useful to choose the preferred model (Stata 
Reference P-St, p.445). The first step is to fit a generalized gamma model, and the second 
step is to test the hypothesis that k = 0 (test for the appropriateness of the lognormal) and 
test the hypothesis that κ = 1 (test for the appropriateness of the weibull), where κ is the 
parameter that is estimated in a generalized gamma model. The hypothesis that κ = 0 is 
rejected at p = 0.00 level, suggesting that the lognormal is perhaps not an adequate model. 
The Wald test for κ = 1 is [(0.06285-1)/0.0686]2 = 29.32, which yield a χ2(1) significance 
of 0.00, providing support for rejecting the Weibull model. To select an appropriate 
model, it is also common to use the Akaike information criterion (AIC). AIC penalizes 
each log likelihood to reflect the number of being estimated in a particular model and 
then comparing them. The AIC can be defined as  
AIC = − 2 (log likelihood) + 2(c + p +1)   
where c is the number of model covariates and p is the number of model-specific 
ancillary parameters. Although the best-fitting model is the one with the largest log-
likelihood, the preferred model is the one with the smallest AIC value. In this study, log-
logistic model has the smaller AIC than Weibull model (7511.6 and 7556.0, 
respectively).38  
The second column in Table 9 shows the estimation results of duration analysis 
assuming loglogistic distribution. A one percent increase in the pension option value 
reduces the hazard ratio by .04 percent, and the effect is statistically significant. A one 
percent increase in pension wealth decreases the duration by .05 percent, and the effect is 
also statistically significant. The effects of pension option value and pension wealth are 
predicted by the model. A one percent increase in earnings increases the duration by 
0.026 percent. A ten percent increase in the longevity risk measured by AEW deceases 
                                                 
38 This study compares AIC from other hazard functions such as log-normal model, generalized gamma 
model, Gompertz model, and exponential model. 
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the duration by 7.8 percent (=100*[exp(0.7539*0.1)-1]).39 The duration of a one-year 
older person is 17.4 percent shorter. The duration of the person with low probability of 
living after 75 is 11.3 percent shorter than that of someone with high or average 
probability of living after 75. The duration is 83.4 percent (=100*[exp(0.6069)-1]) shorter 
for someone with poor health than someone with good health.  
The coefficients of health insurance show the expected signs. Federal health 
insurance or retiree insurance decreases the duration by 45.3 percent and 33.5 percent, 
respectively. On the contrary, employer provided health insurance increases the duration 
by 36.5 percent. The duration for a person who has children younger than 17 is 25.4 
percent larger than a person without young children. The duration for whites is about 
10.6 % shorter than non-white people’s.  
The column 3 and 4 in table 9 show the results of Weibull regression and the Cox 
regression. 40 The assumption that the hazard function is a specific distribution may be 
too restricted, even though in this study the parameters follow the predictions. A Cox 
regression provides more flexible alternatives in the sense that the estimation in a Cox 
regression is performed without any assumptions on the distribution of the hazard 
function. The result is also similar to the log-logistic regression results. For example, a 
one-year increase in age increases the baseline hazard rate by 18 percent. 
 
                                                 
39 For large coefficients, we should exponentiate and subtract unity to obtain the proportionate change 
(Wooldridge, 2002, p.697).  
40 Cox regression provides only the hazard ratio regression. The coefficients should have opposite sign to 
the other specifications in Table 9.  
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3. Robustness Check 
A number of robustness checks are performed on the regressions.41 First, the 
lump-sum benefit from the DC plans can be annuitized at retirement. To check the 
potential effect of annuitization, a dummy variable for the willingness to annuitize the 
lump-sum benefit from the DC plans is added to the basic regression. Table 10 shows that 
the results are robust. In addition, the willingness to annuitize delays the expected 
retirement year or reduces the retirement probability.  
Second, pension value or option values are calculated with fixed interest rates. 
When the interest assumption changes, pension wealth and option value change. Pension 
value is calculated with the following assumption; Scenario #2: Interest rate is 6.0%, 
wage growth is 5%, and inflation rate is 4%; Scenario #3: Interest rate is 6.5%, wage 
growth is 5%, and inflation rate is 4%; and Base scenario: Interest rate is 6.3%, wage 
growth is 5%, and inflation rate is 4%. Pension value in scenario #2 becomes lager than 
in the base scenario since the interest rate in scenario #2 is lower than in base scenario. 
The mean value of pension wealth is $120,739 (basic scenario), $121,917 (scenario #2), 
and $120, 072 (scenario #3). However, Table 11 shows that the effects on retirement are 
not changed.  
Summary of scenarios (Changes in interest rate) 
 Interest Rate Wage Growth Inflation Rate 
Scenario #1 6.30% 5% 4% 
Scenario #2 6.00% 5% 4% 
Scenario #3 6.50% 5% 4% 
 
                                                 
41 In addition to robustness checks described here, to deal with the impact of potential heterogeneity on 
results, the robust regression is compared with the basic regression. The quantitative results do not change 
much and qualitative results are unchanged. 
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Finally, to this point a homogenous utility discount rate is assumed. When 
individuals have different discount rates, the AEW value will change. The same interest 
rate as in the previous analysis is used in this analysis. In sum, the effects of different 
discount values are also checked and the analysis shows that the basic results change little. 
Different discount values are assigned according to Samwick (1998b). Samwick 
estimates the distribution of rate of time preference using the wealth data from the Survey 
of Consumer Finance 1992 and a flexible life-cycle model of consumption under income 
uncertainty. His intuition is that high discounters will save less than low discounters, and 
so it is possible to estimate the discount values from the wealth. According to his 
estimation, the median value of discount rate is 4.28 % per year for the case in which 
relative risk aversion equals 2, and initial wealth is one times the individual’s permanent 
income. In this study, I divide sample into four groups by the ratio of wealth to household 
incomes, and assign four different discount rates, 0, 4.28%, 8.78%, 13.17%, from high 
wealth group to low wealth group, respectively. These discount values are based on 
Samwick’s estimation for the case in which relative risk aversion equals two, and initial 
wealth is one times of individual’s permanent income. The mean value of discount values 
is higher than the discount value used in this study. The assumption that the interest rate 
equals the inverse of discount value does not hold. For the case in which the inverse 
discount value times interest rate is less than one, the model in this study does not always 
predict that a greater longevity risk induces workers to retire later.  
As Table 12 shows, the longevity risk measure, AEW, has the expected sign in 
the OLS regression and the coefficient is significant. In the probit regression, however, 
AEW is not significant, although the sign is as expected. The non-significant sign in the 
probit analysis implies that high discounters put a high value on present consumption, 
and do not care much about future consumption, or longevity risk. The reduced interest in 
longevity risk could explain the insignificant coefficient on AEW. The significance of 
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AEW is restored when the highest discount group is excluded from the analysis as shown 
the third column in the Table 12. The prediction of model can hold even when the 
discount rate is a little higher than the interest rate. 
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V. Conclusion 
This study examines why workers with DC plans retire later than those who have 
DB plans and concludes that the reasons of late retirement of workers with DC plans are 
less pension wealth, lower pension option values and greater longevity risk in DC plans. 
It is important to understand the reason of later retirement of workers with DC plans, 
since the proportion of DC plans in retirement pension plans have increased and are 
expected to keep increasing. Many of researchers have found that financial incentive in 
DB plans induces workers to retire at specific age, i.e., at normal retirement age, since the 
pension benefit will decrease after that age. By analogy, many researchers suggest that 
lacks of financial incentive in DC plans can explain the later retirement. In DC plans, 
workers do not lose pension benefits even though they will keep working in old ages. 
Friedberg and Webb (2004) find the evidence for the effect of differences in financial 
incentives between DB plans and DC plans on retirement. The difference in financial 
incentives, however, is not the only reason of later retirement of workers with DC plans. 
This study explores risk factors in pension plans in addition to pension wealth and 
financial incentives. Workers with DC plans will have more longevity risk, since DB 
plans provide annuitized benefits, while DC plans provide the lump-sum benefit. The 
additional longevity risk requires workers to save more or to work longer or both.  
The model in this study extends the lifecycle consumption model by adding the 
risk factors in pension benefits. This extension will be one of main contributions of this 
study to pension literature. The model predicts that increased risk will induce workers to 
retire later. In addition, pension wealth will induce early retirement, while the option 
value used to measure financial incentives will induce later retirement. This study uses 
annuity equivalent wealth as proxy for longevity risk. The use of AEW may be a way to 
integrate the effect of various factors such as age, sex, degree of risk aversion, and the 
proportion of annuitized wealth on longevity risk.  
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The regression results support the predictions based on the theoretical model. The 
results reveal that retirement wealth prompts workers to retire early. Since pension wealth 
in DC plans is less than pension wealth in DB plans, DC plans have a delaying effect on 
retirement. The pension option value has a negative effect on the probability of 
retirement. DB plans have a large option value before normal retirement age compared to 
DC plans. The option value for DB plans, however, may be negative after normal 
retirement age, and thus the incentive for retirement becomes strong. Finally, the results 
show that longevity risk has a delaying effect on retirement. The fact that the measure of 
longevity risk is more significant in the DC sample implies that longevity risk impacts 
workers with DC plans more than it does workers with DB plans.  
Considering that the delayed retirement in DC plans is not only the result of 
individual choice but also the result of other factors such as longevity risk, policy makers 
should consider the impacts of these factors in pension policies since late retirement may 
be involuntary. The absence of financial incentives for retirement in DC plans can be 
interpreted as the absence of a constraint in a worker’s utility maximization problem. The 
lack of a constraint in DC plans can be utility increasing, in the sense that workers with 
DC plans do not have to consider the decrease in pension benefits that bothers workers 
with DB plans after specific age. Longevity risk, however, can be an additional constraint 
on utility maximization, since workers with DC plans have to consider increased 
longevity risk compared to workers with DB plans. Late retirement due to longevity risk 
can be utility decreasing. Pension policies that encourage DC plans should include a 
compensating mechanism for longevity risk and other risk factors.  
Policy makers and researchers should compare the pension benefits in DC plans 
and in DB plans with annuity equivalent wealth rather than simple discounted present 
value. The longevity risk may be reduced if the annuity benefit is set as a default option. 
The same or more efforts to secure the pension benefit after retirement should be put as 
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those to secure the accumulation of pension wealth before retirements, since the old 
retirees may not so smart as they were before retirement.   
The results of this study have some implications for the current debate over Social 
Security reform. It is generally accepted that current social security system cannot be 
sustained without reforming. If Social Security benefit decreases because of the budget 
deficit, then the reduction will increase additional longevity risk. If Social Security is 
partially privatized, and the accumulation in personal accounts is not linked to 
annuitization similar to the current Social Security benefit, then those changes will also 
bring additional longevity risk. If U.S. government reforms Social Security toward 
increasing longevity risk like above examples, it should incorporate a mechanism that 
ameliorates longevity risk so that privatization does not decrease utility. 
The intuition of this study can be applied to other topics. The longevity risk in DC 
plans may impact individual’s savings. The risk factors in pension types may also affect 
workers’ portfolio choice. This study considers only longevity risk, but the model in this 
study can incorporate other risk factors, such as investment risk in DC plans after 
retirement. The results of this study could be strengthened if earning history data is 
provided, since earning history data provides the flexibility needed for pension value 
calculation as well as for some variables such as Social Security wealth.  
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Appendix 1 
 
(Question. L14)  
You are given the opportunity to take a new and equally good job, with a 50-50 
chance it will double your (family) income and a 50-50 chance that it will cut your 
(family) income by a third.  Would you take the new job?  
 
If yes, respondents are asked to answer the following question:  
(Question. L14a.)  
Suppose the chances were 50-50 that it would double your (family) income, and 
50-50 that it would cut it in half. Would you still take the new job? 
 
If no, respondents are asked to answer the following question:  
(Question L14b.)  
Suppose the chances were 50-50 that it would double your (family) income and 
50-50 that it would cut it by 20 percent.  Would you then take the new job? 
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Appendix 2 
 
Dependent variables 
expected retirement year (= retirement age, retirement year) 
self reported retirement (full + partial retirement): Probit regression  
0 = not retirement, 1 = partial retirement and full retirement 
self reported retirement: Multinomial regression  
0 = not retirement, 1 = partial retirement, 2 = full retirement 
Time to retirement in month  
actual retirement month, year – January, 1992 
 
Independent Variables 
DB only (current job+past job) 
DC only (current job+past job) 
DB and DC (current job+past job) 
log of pension option value at 1992 
log of pension value at 1992 
log of total wealth 
log of household income in 1991 
indicator variable for self employed 
tenure of current job + past longest job 
log of earning 
indicator variable for marriage 
indicator variable for female 
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indicator variable for white 
year of education 
indicator variable for person who was born in US 
low probability of live up to 75=0,1,2 
high probability of live up to 75=8,9,10 
gamma of CRRA utility function 
indicator variable for myopic viewpoint: time period in financial planning < 1year 
indicator variable for "bequest is important" 
indicator variable for  "probability of bequest is high" 
indicator variable for poor health 
dummy for federal health insurance 
indicator variable for employer health insurance 
indicator variable for by employer-sponsored retiree health insurance 
indicator variable for commercial health insurance  
annuity equivalent wealth 
 
  73
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Total No Pension DB only DC only Both
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Retirement status 0.210 0.407 0.208 0.406 0.245 0.430 0.107 0.309 0.218 0.413
Exp. Retirement age 63.372 3.666 63.816 3.599 62.467 3.672 63.842 3.185 62.889 3.821
Exp. Retirement year 28.027 97.166 25.327 104.184 24.474 85.973 58.937 76.605 32.221 83.035
Age 55.870 3.181 55.865 3.176 55.983 3.220 55.841 3.045 55.742 3.209
Female 0.508 0.500 0.542 0.498 0.453 0.498 0.485 0.500 0.449 0.498
Marriage 0.724 0.447 0.702 0.457 0.748 0.434 0.774 0.419 0.759 0.428
Education 12.269 3.110 11.689 3.226 13.288 2.677 12.604 2.785 13.167 2.684
White 0.726 0.446 0.705 0.456 0.725 0.446 0.783 0.413 0.787 0.409
Born US 0.906 0.292 0.884 0.320 0.933 0.250 0.922 0.268 0.954 0.209
Myopic 0.270 0.444 0.298 0.457 0.227 0.419 0.237 0.426 0.226 0.418
Pension coverage 63.7%
pension type (self-report) 8328 3026 36.34% 2628 49.57% 1305 24.61% 1369 25.82%
pension type (company data) 8328 4984 59.85% 1653 49.53% 553 16.54% 1138 34.03%
Pension option value ($1,000) 12.924 36.905 0.000 0.000 30.300 50.695 17.839 29.803 41.895 61.534
Pension value ($1,000) 122.501 181.965 130.049 170.374 47.696 69.410 147.889 222.238
Total net wealth ($1,000) 234.600 517.411 247.406 570.864 200.520 343.826 219.825 520.872 235.289 476.502
Household income ($1,000) 51.213 48.917 47.329 53.944 55.627 34.638 56.236 44.247 59.320 43.705
Earnings ($1,000) 22.928 34.084 19.445 37.728 26.748 21.581 28.764 27.304 29.759 33.101
House owner 0.804 0.397 0.762 0.426 0.868 0.339 0.852 0.355 0.871 0.335
Stock/net wealth 0.045 0.133 0.036 0.129 0.051 0.141 0.057 0.132 0.064 0.137
Bonds/net wealth 0.004 0.026 0.004 0.024 0.005 0.032 0.004 0.021 0.005 0.029
AEW 1.459 0.119 1.450 0.120 1.474 0.118 1.469 0.108 1.469 0.120
AEW2 1.300 0.088 1.314 0.084 1.261 0.089 1.324 0.079 1.284 0.084
Relative risk aversion 3.838 1.680 3.751 1.727 3.967 1.593 3.993 1.579 3.951 1.619
DB wealth/ wealth 0.114 0.232 0.397 0.307 0.257 0.240
Low prob. of living after age75 0.115 0.319 0.129 0.335 0.089 0.285 0.099 0.300 0.100 0.300
Poor health 0.199 0.399 0.234 0.424 0.149 0.356 0.154 0.361 0.136 0.343
Federal health insurance 0.134 0.341 0.140 0.347 0.154 0.361 0.083 0.276 0.105 0.306
Employer-provided health insurance 0.521 0.500 0.418 0.493 0.675 0.469 0.660 0.474 0.682 0.466
Employer-provided retiree health insurance 0.380 0.485 0.259 0.438 0.581 0.494 0.434 0.496 0.588 0.492
Commercial health insurance 0.143 0.350 0.154 0.361 0.135 0.342 0.121 0.327 0.120 0.326
Have children younger than age 17 0.133 0.340 0.137 0.343 0.124 0.330 0.141 0.348 0.126 0.332
Number of children 3.212 2.106 3.336 2.189 2.979 1.964 3.189 1.930 3.022 1.971
High bequest importance 0.231 0.421 0.237 0.425 0.234 0.423 0.188 0.391 0.221 0.415
High bequest prob 0.129 0.335 0.121 0.326 0.140 0.347 0.116 0.320 0.152 0.359
0.134 0.340 0.195 0.396 0.044 0.206 0.038 0.191 0.043 0.203
Self-employed
Tenure 13.559 10.947 11.839 10.701 16.914 10.829 13.616 10.290 15.518 10.989
Tenure (current and past job) 14.735 10.960 12.480 10.624 18.762 10.340 14.504 10.310 17.750 11.047
Industry: Agriculture, mining  & construction 0.072 0.259 0.095 0.293 0.036 0.187 0.056 0.230 0.034 0.182
Industry: Manufacturing & transportation 0.194 0.396 0.167 0.373 0.226 0.418 0.230 0.421 0.253 0.435
Industry: Whole sale & services 0.249 0.432 0.297 0.457 0.129 0.336 0.293 0.456 0.187 0.390
Industry: Professional & pub. Administration 0.239 0.426 0.164 0.370 0.388 0.487 0.291 0.455 0.326 0.469
Occupation: skilled 0.232 0.422 0.182 0.386 0.310 0.463 0.325 0.469 0.296 0.457
Occupation: semi skilled 0.191 0.393 0.185 0.388 0.185 0.388 0.230 0.421 0.207 0.406
Occupation: unskilled 0.335 0.472 0.359 0.480 0.289 0.453 0.320 0.467 0.301 0.459  
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Table 2 
Self-reported retirement status 
 
 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 
Not retirement 6578 5220 4036 3119 2348 1675 
(%) 79.0 68.8 58.5 50.9 40.3 30.3 
Partial retirement 580 801 891 913 943 996 
(%) 7.0 10.6 12.9 14.9 16.2 18.0 
Full retirement 1170 1565 1975 2096 2536 2861 
(%) 14.0 20.6 28.6 34.2 43.5 51.7 
 8328 7586 6902 6128 5827 5532 
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Table 3 
Regression of expected time to retirement 
 
1 2
Independent Variables Coefficient Std err. Coefficient Std err.
Pension, wealth, and earning
DB only (d) -0.1682 0.1591 -0.1668 0.1584
DC only (d) 0.4230 ** 0.1716 0.4602 * 0.1719
DB & DC (d) -0.2038 0.1830 -0.1472 0.1829
Pension option value (log) -0.0037 0.0152 -0.0025 0.0151
Pension wealth (log) -0.0071 0.0175 -0.0303 ** 0.0150
Non-pension wealth (log) -0.1578 * 0.0225 -0.1548 * 0.0223
Earnings (log) 0.0262 0.0293 0.0361 0.0292
Longevity risk
AEW 5.2922 * 0.8857
Age -0.7341 * 0.0176 -0.8247 * 0.0239
Female -0.7511 * 0.1241
Risk aversion 0.0059 0.0321
Pre-annuitized wealth (%) -1.7039 * 0.3162
Low prob of. Living at 75 (d) -0.5741 * 0.1841 -0.5129 * 0.1841
Poor health (d) -0.3895 ** 0.1677 -0.3949 ** 0.1681
Health insurance
Federal Gov. health ins (d) -0.1026 0.1942 -0.1579 0.1943
Employer hl. Ins (d) 0.6752 * 0.1443 0.7038 * 0.1445
Retiree employer hl. Ins. (d) -0.6865 * 0.1381 -0.7204 * 0.1382
Commercial hl. Ins. (d) 0.0380 0.1519 0.0296 0.1522
Bequest motive
Children 17 or younger (d) 0.6309 * 0.1600 0.7068 * 0.1588
Number of Children 0.0161 0.0277 0.0116 0.0276
High bequest import. (d) 0.0711 0.1323 0.0786 0.1327
High bequest prob. (d) -0.3270 ** 0.1634 -0.3064 *** 0.1638
Demographic
Education (year of) 0.0657 * 0.0237 0.0739 * 0.0237
Married (d) -0.4248 * 0.1322 -0.3600 * 0.1314
White (d) 0.2065 0.1360 0.2363 *** 0.1362
Born in U.S. (d) -0.3631 *** 0.1906 -0.3889 ** 0.1911
Myopic (d) -0.3372 * 0.1247 -0.3455 * 0.1249
Job
Self-employed (d) 1.4620 * 0.1874 1.5243 * 0.1864
Tenure (current job) -0.0588 * 0.0054 -0.0620 * 0.0053
Industry: manufactory, transport (d) 0.1374 0.2032 0.0954 0.2032
Industry: service (d) 0.3555 *** 0.2054 0.2909 0.2040
Industry: prof. svc & pub admin. (d) 0.2717 0.2183 0.1002 0.2141
Occupation: skilled (d) 0.3847 ** 0.1533 0.3606 ** 0.1535
Occupation: semi_skilled (d) 0.3171 ** 0.1473 0.2125 0.1445
Constant 50.5532 * 1.0882 48.1211 * 1.1005
Number of obs 4451 4451
F 86.78 90.99
Prob > F 0.000 0.000
R-squared 0.393 0.390
Adj R-squared 0.389 0.385
 
(d) dummy variable          
* significant at 1% level          
* * significant at 5 level          
*** significant at 10% level  
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Table 4 
Regression of expected time to retirement (by pension types) 
 
1 2 3
DB & DC DB only DC only
Independent Variables Coefficient Std err. Coefficient Std err. Coefficient Std err.
Pension, wealth, and earning
DC only (Self report) (d) 0.6508 * 0.1549
Pension option value (log) -0.0093 0.0190 -0.0022 0.0224 -0.0360 0.0378
Pension wealth (log) -0.0128 0.0189 -0.0343 0.0227 0.0300 0.0371
Non-pension wealth (log) -0.1559 * 0.0330 -0.1027 ** 0.0416 -0.2464 * 0.0549
Earnings (log) 0.0207 0.0453 -0.0029 0.0553 0.0749 0.0799
Longevity risk
AEW 5.2940 * 1.2105 2.7003 *** 1.4949 9.9941 * 2.1314
Age -0.8462 * 0.0326 -0.7637 * 0.0403 -0.9915 * 0.0566
Low prob of. Living at 75 (d) -0.4181 0.2650 -0.6091 *** 0.3339 0.0389 0.4437
Poor health (d) -0.2470 0.2387 -0.3206 0.2909 -0.1757 0.4197
Health insurance
Federal Gov. health ins (d) -0.4868 *** 0.2718 -0.4244 0.3108 -0.8178 0.5668
Employer hl. Ins (d) 0.7519 * 0.1976 0.9507 * 0.2610 0.4481 0.3096
Retiree employer hl. Ins. (d) -0.7264 * 0.1832 -0.8561 * 0.2407 -0.6111 ** 0.2877
Commercial hl. Ins. (d) 0.1303 0.2194 0.2651 0.2677 0.0056 0.3886
Bequest motive
Children 17 or younger (d) 0.5677 * 0.2194 0.7917 * 0.2759 0.1462 0.3632
Number of Children -0.0327 0.0388 -0.0056 0.0489 -0.0754 0.0637
High bequest import. (d) 0.1507 0.1863 0.1303 0.2312 0.0925 0.3157
High bequest prob. (d) -0.5773 ** 0.2313 -0.7163 ** 0.2921 -0.2826 0.3806
Demographic
Education (year of) 0.0309 0.0350 -0.0318 0.0440 0.1636 * 0.0581
Married (d) -0.3216 *** 0.1860 -0.3875 0.2359 -0.2271 0.3039
White (d) 0.1710 0.1853 0.3724 0.2284 -0.3440 0.3219
Born in U.S. (d) -0.0959 0.2801 -0.4057 0.3533 0.6047 0.4655
Myopic (d) -0.4009 ** 0.1708 -0.4222 ** 0.2132 -0.3129 0.2887
Job
Self-employed (d) 1.9835 * 0.2984 2.2862 * 0.3819 1.2747 * 0.4894
Tenure (current job) -0.0667 * 0.0074 -0.0648 * 0.0092 -0.0651 * 0.0129
Industry: manufactory, transport (d) 0.3673 0.2957 0.5106 0.3965 0.0992 0.4483
Industry: service (d) 0.8935 * 0.3062 1.0282 ** 0.4101 0.5331 0.4623
Industry: prof. svc & pub admin. (d) 0.6426 ** 0.3048 0.7518 *** 0.4025 0.4487 0.4751
Occupation: skilled (d) 0.3183 0.2181 0.1029 0.2739 0.7535 ** 0.3636
Occupation: semi_skilled (d) -0.0188 0.2015 -0.3370 0.2554 0.5172 0.3288
Constant 49.3506 * 1.5725 48.6625 * 1.9615 50.6466 * 2.6488
Number of obs 2307 1491 816
F 54.10 33.39 22.75
Prob > F 0.000 0 0.000
R-squared 0.408 0.390 0.447
Adj R-squared 0.400 0.378 0.428
 
(d) dummy variable 
* significant at 1% level 
* * significant at 5% level 
*** significant at 10% level 
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Table 5 
Probit regression of self-reported retirement status 
 
1 2
Marginal Marginal
Independent Variables Coefficient Std err. Effect Coefficient Std err. Effect
Pension, wealth, and earning
DB only (d) 0.0052 0.0570 0.0010 0.0062 0.0565 0.0012
DC only (d) -0.2222 * 0.0668 -0.0401 -0.2102 * 0.0665 -0.0382
DB & DC (d) -0.5214 * 0.0809 -0.0842 -0.5060 * 0.0801 -0.0824
Pension option value (log) -0.1810 * 0.0081 -0.0358 -0.1782 * 0.0080 -0.0353
Pension wealth (log) 0.0809 * 0.0068 0.0160 0.0655 * 0.0052 0.0130
Non-pension wealth (log) 0.0076 0.0078 0.0015 0.0117 0.0077 0.0023
Earnings (log) -0.1550 * 0.0186 -0.0306 -0.1560 * 0.0186 -0.0309
Longevity risk
AEW -0.7457 ** 0.3299 -0.1476
Age 0.0569 * 0.0069 0.0112 0.0686 * 0.0091 0.0136
Female 0.0798 *** 0.0485 0.0158
Risk aversion -0.0516 * 0.0121 -0.0102
Pre-annuitized wealth (%) -0.3170 ** 0.1410 -0.0626
Low prob of. Living at 75 (d) 0.2380 * 0.0633 0.0523 0.2395 * 0.0630 0.0528
Poor health (d) 0.7029 * 0.0525 0.1765 0.7118 * 0.0524 0.1795
Health insurance
Federal Gov. health ins (d) 0.7372 * 0.0558 0.1941 0.7196 * 0.0555 0.1887
Employer hl. Ins (d) -0.6319 * 0.0666 -0.1312 -0.6378 * 0.0664 -0.1327
Retiree employer hl. Ins. (d) 0.4355 * 0.0694 0.0902 0.4255 * 0.0692 0.0882
Commercial hl. Ins. (d) -0.1141 ** 0.0564 -0.0215 -0.1159 ** 0.0563 -0.0218
Bequest motive
Children 17 or younger (d) -0.1607 ** 0.0711 -0.0296 -0.1583 ** 0.0705 -0.0292
Number of Children 0.0227 ** 0.0103 0.0045 0.0230 ** 0.0103 0.0046
High bequest import. (d) -0.0929 *** 0.0519 -0.0178 -0.0933 *** 0.0518 -0.0179
High bequest prob. (d) 0.2100 * 0.0632 0.0453 0.2182 * 0.0631 0.0473
Demographic
Education (year of) 0.0350 * 0.0090 0.0069 0.0357 * 0.0089 0.0071
Married (d) 0.0840 0.0530 0.0162 0.0862 0.0527 0.0167
White (d) 0.0781 0.0529 0.0151 0.0872 *** 0.0527 0.0168
Born in U.S. (d) 0.2143 ** 0.0832 0.0380 0.2084 ** 0.0829 0.0371
Myopic (d) 0.1201 * 0.0457 0.0245 0.1218 * 0.0456 0.0250
Job
Self-employed (d) -0.1532 * 0.0589 -0.0284 -0.1481 ** 0.0585 -0.0276
Tenure 0.0262 * 0.0021 0.0052 0.0250 * 0.0021 0.0049
Industry: manufactory, transport (d) 0.0847 0.0777 0.0171 0.0874 0.0773 0.0177
Industry: service (d) 0.0989 0.0755 0.0199 0.1061 0.0744 0.0215
Industry: prof. svc & pub admin. (d) -0.0440 0.0849 -0.0086 -0.0493 0.0825 -0.0096
Occupation: skilled (d) 0.0244 0.0596 0.0049 0.0248 0.0595 0.0049
Occupation: semi_skilled (d) 0.1209 ** 0.0556 0.0247 0.1191 ** 0.0548 0.0244
Constant -3.6529 * 0.4501 -3.5030 * 0.4577
Number of obs 7206 7206
Log likelihood -2488.3 -2498.6
LR chi2 2508.67 2488.1
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.335 0.332
 
(d) dummy variable 
* significant at 1% level 
* * significant at 5% level 
*** significant at 10% level 
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Table 6 
Multinomial logit regression of self-reported retirement status 
 
1 2
Partial retirement Full retirement Marginal effect Partial retirement Full retirement Marginal effect
Independent Variables Coefficient Std err. Coefficient Std err. Partial Ret Full Ret Coefficient Std err. Coefficient Pr > |t| Partial Ret Full Ret
Pension, wealth, and earning
DB only (d) 0.083 0.138 -0.044 0.124 0.004 -0.002 0.118 0.136 -0.060 0.626 0.006 -0.002
DC only (d) -0.215 0.165 -0.578 * 0.152 -0.010 -0.021 -0.202 0.165 -0.551 * 0.000 -0.009 -0.017
DB & DC (d) -0.654 * 0.198 -1.261 * 0.188 -0.030 -0.045 -0.609 * 0.196 -1.249 * 0.000 -0.024 -0.034
Pension option value (log) -0.252 * 0.021 -0.471 * 0.032 -0.012 -0.017 -0.252 * 0.020 -0.461 * 0.000 -0.012 -0.017
Pension wealth (log) 0.104 * 0.016 0.174 * 0.014 0.005 0.006 0.097 * 0.012 0.129 * 0.000 0.005 0.005
Non-pension wealth (log) 0.047 ** 0.021 -0.004 0.016 0.002 0.000 0.045 ** 0.021 0.010 0.528 0.002 0.000
Earnings (log) -0.162 * 0.046 -0.350 * 0.038 -0.007 -0.013 -0.164 * 0.046 -0.349 * 0.000 -0.007 -0.013
Longevity risk
AEW -0.846 0.791 -1.792 * 0.010 -0.039 -0.066
Age 0.064 * 0.017 0.138 * 0.015 0.003 0.005 0.076 * 0.022 0.166 * 0.000 0.003 0.006
Female -0.037 0.116 0.325 * 0.106 -0.002 0.012
Risk aversion -0.087 * 0.029 -0.090 * 0.026 -0.004 -0.003
Pre-annuitized wealth (%) -0.069 0.333 -0.967 * 0.297 -0.001 -0.036
Low prob of. Living at 75 (d) 0.532 * 0.150 0.342 * 0.130 0.026 0.012 0.548 * 0.149 0.327 ** 0.011 0.032 0.012
Poor health (d) 0.617 * 0.135 1.619 * 0.108 0.027 0.059 0.627 * 0.135 1.637 * 0.000 0.029 0.101
Health insurance
Federal Gov. health ins (d) 1.041 * 0.133 1.396 * 0.111 0.049 0.050 1.026 * 0.132 1.361 * 0.000 0.064 0.077
Employer hl. Ins (d) -0.987 * 0.169 -1.260 * 0.157 -0.047 -0.045 -0.961 * 0.168 -1.306 * 0.000 -0.048 -0.053
Retiree employer hl. Ins. (d) 0.625 * 0.176 0.966 * 0.162 0.029 0.035 0.596 * 0.175 0.969 * 0.000 0.029 0.039
Commercial hl. Ins. (d) 0.085 0.124 -0.471 * 0.129 0.005 -0.018 0.085 0.123 -0.457 * 0.000 0.005 -0.015
Bequest motive
Children 17 or younger (d) -0.314 *** 0.173 -0.218 0.162 -0.015 -0.007 -0.289 *** 0.172 -0.233 0.145 -0.013 -0.008
Number of Children 0.056 ** 0.025 0.028 0.022 0.003 0.001 0.054 ** 0.025 0.032 0.147 0.003 0.001
High bequest import. (d) -0.311 ** 0.131 -0.006 0.110 -0.016 0.000 -0.308 ** 0.131 -0.022 0.843 -0.014 0.000
High bequest prob. (d) 0.490 * 0.146 0.263 *** 0.141 0.024 0.009 0.495 * 0.146 0.294 ** 0.036 0.028 0.011
Demographic
Education (year of) 0.058 * 0.022 0.062 * 0.019 0.003 0.002 0.063 * 0.022 0.059 * 0.002 0.003 0.002
Married (d) 0.073 0.129 0.241 ** 0.114 0.003 0.009 0.095 0.129 0.224 ** 0.049 0.004 0.008
White (d) 0.032 0.130 0.179 0.113 0.001 0.007 0.035 0.130 0.211 *** 0.061 0.001 0.007
Born in U.S. (d) 0.270 0.205 0.476 ** 0.188 0.013 0.017 0.252 0.205 0.471 ** 0.012 0.011 0.015
Myopic (d) -0.045 0.115 0.408 * 0.095 -0.003 0.015 -0.051 0.115 0.414 * 0.000 -0.003 0.017
Job
Self-employed (d) 0.314 ** 0.129 -1.045 * 0.150 0.018 -0.039 0.345 * 0.128 -1.042 * 0.000 0.021 -0.030
Tenure 0.042 * 0.005 0.050 * 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.041 * 0.005 0.046 * 0.000 0.002 0.002
Industry: manufactory, transport (d) -0.308 *** 0.186 0.420 ** 0.172 -0.016 0.016 -0.320 *** 0.186 0.451 * 0.008 -0.016 0.020
Industry: service (d) 0.291 *** 0.168 0.077 0.173 0.014 0.002 0.263 0.166 0.144 0.398 0.013 0.005
Industry: prof. svc & pub admin. (d) 0.001 0.195 -0.191 0.190 0.000 -0.007 -0.053 0.191 -0.132 0.474 -0.002 -0.005
Occupation: skilled (d) -0.236 *** 0.143 0.254 *** 0.131 -0.012 0.010 -0.236 *** 0.143 0.254 ** 0.050 -0.012 0.011
Occupation: semi_skilled (d) -0.048 0.135 0.417 * 0.120 -0.003 0.016 -0.072 0.134 0.438 * 0.000 -0.005 0.018
Constant -6.253 * 1.095 -8.581 * 0.987 -6.166 * 1.108 -8.042 * 0.000
Number of obs 7192 7192
Log likelihood -3264.26 -3280.79
LR chi2 2939.09 2906.02
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.310 0.307
 
(d) dummy variable 
* significant at 1% level 
* * significant at 5% level 
*** significant at 10% level 
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Table 7 
Probit regression of change in self-reported retirement status from Wave1 to Wave 2 
 
1 2
Marginal Marginal
Independent Variables Coefficient Std err. Effect Coefficient Std err. Effect
Pension, wealth, and earning
DB only (d) 0.1095 0.0727 0.0197 0.1221 *** 0.0720 0.0220
DC only (d) 0.0936 0.0782 0.0170 0.0872 0.0781 0.0158
DB & DC (d) -0.0067 0.0857 -0.0012 -0.0016 0.0852 -0.0003
Pension option value (log) -0.0257 * 0.0073 -0.0045 -0.0274 * 0.0073 -0.0048
Pension wealth (log) 0.0232 * 0.0084 0.0041 0.0305 * 0.0071 0.0053
Non-pension wealth (log) 0.0283 * 0.0108 0.0049 0.0245 ** 0.0105 0.0043
Earnings (log) -0.0451 * 0.0112 -0.0079 -0.0443 * 0.0112 -0.0077
Longevity risk
AEW -0.5021 0.3925 -0.0879
Age 0.1187 * 0.0082 0.0207 0.1264 * 0.0110 0.0221
Female 0.0078 0.0572 0.0014
Risk aversion -0.0260 *** 0.0147 -0.0045
Pre-annuitized wealth (%) 0.3036 ** 0.1455 0.0530
Low prob of. Living at 75 (d) -0.0067 0.0876 -0.0012 -0.0034 0.0874 -0.0006
Poor health (d) 0.2644 * 0.0715 0.0523 0.2634 * 0.0715 0.0522
Health insurance
Federal Gov. health ins (d) 0.2692 * 0.0812 0.0542 0.2769 * 0.0809 0.0561
Employer hl. Ins (d) -0.2358 * 0.0691 -0.0425 -0.2293 * 0.0689 -0.0414
Retiree employer hl. Ins. (d) 0.2227 * 0.0683 0.0398 0.2247 * 0.0681 0.0403
Commercial hl. Ins. (d) -0.0115 0.0661 -0.0020 -0.0059 0.0659 -0.0010
Bequest motive
Children 17 or younger (d) -0.1838 ** 0.0835 -0.0295 -0.1770 ** 0.0828 -0.0286
Number of Children 0.0075 0.0126 0.0013 0.0070 0.0126 0.0012
High bequest import. (d) -0.0078 0.0628 -0.0014 -0.0077 0.0628 -0.0013
High bequest prob. (d) 0.0591 0.0760 0.0106 0.0571 0.0760 0.0103
Demographic
Education (year of) 0.0072 0.0110 0.0013 0.0088 0.0110 0.0015
Married (d) -0.0944 0.0603 -0.0170 -0.0902 0.0597 -0.0162
White (d) 0.0438 0.0644 0.0075 0.0366 0.0642 0.0063
Born in U.S. (d) 0.4912 * 0.1135 0.0656 0.4917 * 0.1134 0.0659
Myopic (d) 0.0764 0.0563 0.0137 0.0756 0.0562 0.0136
Job
Self-employed (d) -0.1418 *** 0.0820 -0.0232 -0.1286 0.0812 -0.0213
Tenure 0.0071 * 0.0024 0.0012 0.0075 * 0.0024 0.0013
Industry: manufactory, transport (d) 0.0309 0.0975 0.0055 0.0245 0.0971 0.0043
Industry: service (d) 0.1591 *** 0.0956 0.0289 0.1430 0.0945 0.0259
Industry: prof. svc & pub admin. (d) 0.0263 0.1032 0.0046 0.0112 0.1007 0.0020
Occupation: skilled (d) 0.0267 0.0702 0.0047 0.0266 0.0702 0.0047
Occupation: semi_skilled (d) -0.0009 0.0670 -0.0002 -0.0099 0.0658 -0.0017
Constant -8.4208 * 0.5200 -1.4704 -8.2721 * 0.5214
Number of obs 5236 5236
Log likelihood -1762.43 -1765.26
LR chi2 480.59 474.93
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.120 0.1186
 
 (d) dummy variable 
* significant at 1% level 
* * significant at 5% level 
*** significant at 10% level 
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Table 8 
Multinomial logit regression of change in self-reported retirement status from Wave1 to Wave 2 
 
1 2
Partial retirement Full retirement Marginal effect Partial retirement Full retirement Marginal effect
Independent Variables Coefficient Std err. Coefficient Std err. Partial Ret Full Ret Coefficient Std err. Coefficient Std err. Partial Ret Full Ret
Pension, wealth, and earning
DB only (d) -0.039 0.183 0.408 ** 0.190 -0.003 0.017 0.024 0.180 0.405 ** 0.189 0.000 0.018
DC only (d) 0.067 0.194 0.302 0.206 0.002 0.012 0.061 0.194 0.295 0.206 0.002 0.013
DB & DC (d) -0.194 0.220 0.171 0.219 -0.009 0.007 -0.145 0.218 0.163 0.218 -0.007 0.007
Pension option value (log) -0.057 * 0.019 -0.029 *** 0.017 -0.003 -0.001 -0.062 * 0.019 -0.030 *** 0.017 -0.003 -0.001
Pension wealth (log) 0.044 ** 0.021 0.031 0.020 0.002 0.001 0.067 * 0.017 0.033 ** 0.017 0.003 0.001
Non-pension wealth (log) 0.039 0.028 0.066 ** 0.031 0.002 0.003 0.025 0.027 0.066 ** 0.030 0.001 0.003
Earnings (log) -0.069 * 0.024 -0.105 * 0.033 -0.003 -0.004 -0.065 * 0.024 -0.106 * 0.033 -0.003 -0.004
Longevity risk
AEW -0.556 0.992 -0.520 0.936 -0.025 -0.020
Age 0.191 * 0.021 0.261 * 0.022 0.008 0.010 0.199 * 0.028 0.269 * 0.028 0.009 0.011
Female -0.172 0.146 0.089 0.142 -0.008 0.004
Risk aversion -0.067 *** 0.037 -0.024 0.038 -0.003 -0.001
Pre-annuitized wealth (%) 0.805 ** 0.385 0.176 0.342 0.037 0.006
Low prob of. Living at 75 (d) -0.126 0.240 0.058 0.209 -0.006 0.003 -0.107 0.239 0.054 0.209 -0.005 0.002
Poor health (d) 0.134 0.197 0.824 * 0.161 0.004 0.033 0.125 0.197 0.824 * 0.161 0.004 0.045
Health insurance
Federal Gov. health ins (d) 0.504 * 0.193 0.396 ** 0.193 0.022 0.015 0.539 * 0.192 0.400 ** 0.192 0.030 0.017
Employer hl. Ins (d) -0.441 ** 0.182 -0.530 * 0.178 -0.019 -0.021 -0.405 ** 0.180 -0.534 * 0.177 -0.018 -0.022
Retiree employer hl. Ins. (d) 0.360 ** 0.183 0.533 * 0.170 0.016 0.021 0.351 *** 0.181 0.535 * 0.170 0.016 0.022
Commercial hl. Ins. (d) 0.035 0.161 -0.046 0.165 0.002 -0.002 0.052 0.161 -0.042 0.165 0.003 -0.002
Bequest motive
Children 17 or younger (d) -0.344 0.226 -0.473 ** 0.237 -0.015 -0.019 -0.291 0.224 -0.482 ** 0.236 -0.012 -0.016
Number of Children 0.026 0.033 0.011 0.031 0.001 0.000 0.023 0.033 0.012 0.031 0.001 0.000
High bequest import. (d) -0.176 0.169 0.209 0.150 -0.009 0.009 -0.172 0.169 0.209 0.150 -0.008 0.009
High bequest prob. (d) 0.134 0.197 0.047 0.186 0.006 0.002 0.120 0.197 0.047 0.186 0.006 0.002
Demographic
Education (year of) 0.026 0.028 -0.014 0.027 0.001 -0.001 0.033 0.028 -0.014 0.027 0.002 -0.001
Married (d) -0.198 0.155 -0.146 0.150 -0.009 -0.006 -0.167 0.154 -0.156 0.148 -0.008 -0.006
White (d) 0.164 0.176 -0.032 0.156 0.008 -0.002 0.148 0.176 -0.037 0.155 0.007 -0.002
Born in U.S. (d) 0.685 ** 0.295 1.285 * 0.358 0.029 0.051 0.674 ** 0.294 1.288 * 0.358 0.024 0.033
Myopic (d) -0.059 0.150 0.385 * 0.133 -0.004 0.016 -0.074 0.150 0.387 * 0.133 -0.004 0.018
Job
Self-employed (d) 0.177 0.186 -1.191 * 0.282 0.011 -0.049 0.230 0.184 -1.200 * 0.280 0.014 -0.035
Tenure -0.009 0.006 0.031 * 0.006 0.000 0.001 -0.007 0.006 0.031 * 0.006 0.000 0.001
Industry: manufactory, transport (d) -0.299 0.236 0.446 0.281 -0.015 0.019 -0.329 0.236 0.454 0.281 -0.015 0.021
Industry: service (d) 0.165 0.219 0.421 0.287 0.007 0.017 0.093 0.216 0.432 0.284 0.003 0.019
Industry: prof. svc & pub admin. (d) -0.317 0.251 0.400 0.295 -0.015 0.017 -0.408 *** 0.245 0.421 0.289 -0.019 0.019
Occupation: skilled (d) -0.227 0.182 0.378 ** 0.174 -0.011 0.016 -0.237 0.183 0.382 ** 0.173 -0.011 0.017
Occupation: semi_skilled (d) -0.021 0.165 0.017 0.171 -0.001 0.001 -0.078 0.162 0.028 0.168 -0.004 0.001
Constant -13.532 * 1.343 -19.262 * 1.415 -0.585 -0.755 -13.565 * 1.349 -19.0639 * 1.4119
Number of obs 4963 4963
Log likelihood -2112.52 -2117.5
LR chi2 627.60 617.64
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.129 0.127
 
(d) dummy variable 
* significant at 1% level 
* * significant at 5% level 
*** significant at 10% level 
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Table 9 
Survival regression of time to retirement year  
 
1 2 3 4
Gamma Loglogistic Weibull - AFT Cox - Hazard ratio
Independent Variables Coefficient Std err. Coefficient Std err. Coefficient Std err. Coefficient Std err.
Pension, wealth, and earning
DB only (d) -0.1045 0.0720 -0.1039 0.0733 -0.1028 0.0680 0.1056 0.0729
DC only (d) -0.0269 0.0774 -0.0002 0.0779 -0.0512 0.0730 0.0502 0.0784
DB & DC (d) 0.0572 0.0871 0.0955 0.0868 0.0193 0.0822 -0.0232 0.0882
Pension option value (log) 0.0434 * 0.0077 0.0509 * 0.0080 0.0344 * 0.0071 -0.0361 * 0.0076
Pension wealth (log) -0.0446 * 0.0075 -0.0528 * 0.0078 -0.0363 * 0.0068 0.0384 * 0.0073
Non-pension wealth (log) -0.0071 0.0098 -0.0069 0.0099 -0.0073 0.0093 0.0086 0.0100
Earnings (log) 0.0249 ** 0.0115 0.0261 ** 0.0119 0.0230 ** 0.0107 -0.0244 ** 0.0115
Longevity risk
AEW 0.7370 *** 0.3982 0.7539 *** 0.4186 0.7481 0.3672 -0.8192 ** 0.3939
Age -0.1740 * 0.0113 -0.1740 * 0.0115 -0.1690 * 0.0106 0.1806 * 0.0113
Female
Risk aversion
Pre-annuitized wealth (%)
Low prob of. Living at 75 (d) -0.1591 *** 0.0865 -0.1103 0.0897 -0.1688 ** 0.0803 0.1786 ** 0.0861
Poor health (d) -0.5122 * 0.0741 -0.6069 * 0.0779 -0.4211 * 0.0661 0.4505 * 0.0706
Health insurance
Federal Gov. health ins (d) -0.4084 * 0.0868 -0.4533 * 0.0940 -0.3524 * 0.0788 0.3817 * 0.0845
Employer hl. Ins (d) 0.3782 * 0.0679 0.3651 * 0.0690 0.3658 * 0.0640 -0.3855 * 0.0685
Retiree employer hl. Ins. (d) -0.3335 * 0.0676 -0.3346 * 0.0685 -0.3180 * 0.0637 0.3389 * 0.0682
Commercial hl. Ins. (d) 0.1218 *** 0.0696 0.1236 *** 0.0713 0.1138 *** 0.0655 -0.1203 *** 0.0703
Bequest motive
Children 17 or younger (d) 0.2637 * 0.0780 0.2541 * 0.0780 0.2601 * 0.0753 -0.2761 * 0.0807
Number of Children -0.0038 0.0127 -0.0044 0.0129 -0.0031 0.0119 0.0036 0.0128
High bequest import. (d) -0.0591 0.0626 -0.0374 0.0646 -0.0657 0.0584 0.0702 0.0627
High bequest prob. (d) -0.0642 0.0762 -0.0941 0.0795 -0.0414 0.0711 0.0436 0.0763
Demographic
Education (year of) 0.0032 0.0106 0.0008 0.0109 0.0069 0.0098 -0.0071 0.0105
Married (d) -0.0620 0.0609 -0.0454 0.0621 -0.0698 0.0573 0.0729 0.0615
White (d) -0.1234 *** 0.0654 -0.1057 0.0668 -0.1299 ** 0.0616 0.1419 ** 0.0661
Born in U.S. (d) -0.1029 0.0954 -0.1549 0.0947 -0.0706 0.0907 0.0747 0.0972
Myopic (d) -0.0513 0.0569 -0.0311 0.0581 -0.0629 0.0534 0.0697 0.0573
Job
Self-employed (d) 0.2458 * 0.0783 0.2313 * 0.0804 0.2523 * 0.0746 -0.2677 * 0.0800
Tenure -0.0163 * 0.0025 -0.0176 * 0.0026 -0.0145 * 0.0023 0.0155 * 0.0024
Industry: manufactory, transport (d) -0.0019 0.0924 -0.0436 0.0939 0.0214 0.0862 -0.0256 0.0925
Industry: service (d) 0.0750 0.0905 0.0249 0.0919 0.1070 0.0848 -0.1097 0.0910
Industry: prof. svc & pub admin. (d) 0.1800 *** 0.0967 0.1395 0.0977 0.1866 ** 0.0908 -0.1985 ** 0.0975
Occupation: skilled (d) 0.0885 0.0707 0.0812 0.0726 0.0934 0.0663 -0.1059 0.0712
Occupation: semi_skilled (d) 0.0312 0.0667 0.0084 0.0680 0.0419 0.0628 -0.0465 0.0673
Constant 13.6736 0.5160 13.5044 0.5203 13.4141 0.4890
ln_sig 0.0719 0.0322 -0.3308 0.0207 0.0706 0.0208
sigma/gamma/p 1.0746 0.0346 0.7183 0.0149 1.0731 0.0224
kappa 0.6285 0.0686
Number of obs 2957 2957 2957 2957
Log likelihood -3731.45 -3722.82 -3745.02 -12867.18
LR chi2 860.86 870.20 849.30 830.82
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
(d) dummy variable 
* significant at 1% level 
* * significant at 5% level 
*** significant at 10% level
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Table 10 
Regression of expected time to retirement and Probit regression of self-reported 
retirement status (Willingness to annuitize) 
 
OLS Probit
Independent Variables Coefficient Std err. Coefficient Std err.
Willingness to annuitize 0.3490 0.1690 -1.1105 * 0.1585
Pension, wealth, and earning
DB only (d) -0.1492 0.1586 -0.0091 0.0567
DC only (d) 0.3504 *** 0.1799 -0.0828 0.0687
DB & DC (d) -0.2366 0.1879 -0.3707 * 0.0825
Pension option value (log) -0.0048 0.0151 -0.1757 * 0.0081
Pension wealth (log) -0.0304 ** 0.0150 0.0645 * 0.0053
Non-pension wealth (log) -0.1544 * 0.0223 0.0120 0.0077
Earnings (log) 0.0358 0.0292 -0.1558 * 0.0187
Longevity risk
AEW 5.2327 * 0.8858 -0.7451 ** 0.3323
Age -0.8226 * 0.0239 0.0672 * 0.0092
Low prob of. Living at 75 (d) -0.5130 * 0.1841 0.2403 * 0.0634
Poor health (d) -0.3865 ** 0.1681 0.7013 * 0.0527
Health insurance
Federal Gov. health ins (d) -0.1481 0.1943 0.7085 * 0.0557
Employer hl. Ins (d) 0.7121 * 0.1445 -0.6631 * 0.0672
Retiree employer hl. Ins. (d) -0.7274 * 0.1382 0.4468 ** 0.0701
Commercial hl. Ins. (d) 0.0326 0.1522 -0.1366 * 0.0566
Bequest motive
Children 17 or younger (d) 0.7091 * 0.1588 -0.1434 ** 0.0710
Number of Children 0.0128 0.0276 0.0221 *** 0.0103
High bequest import. (d) 0.0797 0.1326 -0.0952 * 0.0521
High bequest prob. (d) -0.2987 *** 0.1638 0.2042 * 0.0634
Demographic
Education (year of) 0.0742 * 0.0237 0.0359 * 0.0090
Married (d) -0.3599 * 0.1313 0.0878 *** 0.0530
White (d) 0.2334 *** 0.1362 0.0888 *** 0.0530
Born in U.S. (d) -0.3847 ** 0.1910 0.2136 * 0.0834
Myopic (d) -0.3428 * 0.1249 0.1190 * 0.0459
Job
Self-employed (d) 1.5345 * 0.1864 -0.1746 * 0.0588
Tenure (current job) -0.0624 * 0.0053 0.0261 * 0.0021
Industry: manufactory, transport (d) 0.0982 0.2031 0.0825 0.0777
Industry: service (d) 0.2928 0.2039 0.1075 0.0747
Industry: prof. svc & pub admin. (d) 0.0865 0.2141 -0.0417 0.0830
Occupation: skilled (d) 0.3613 ** 0.1534 0.0334 0.0599
Occupation: semi_skilled (d) 0.2141 0.1444 0.1283 ** 0.0552
Constant 48.0728 * 1.1003 -3.4330 * 0.4600
Number of obs 4451 Number of obs 7206
F 87.35 Log likelihood -2464.1471
Prob > F 0.000 LR chi2 2556.92
R-squared 0.390 Prob > chi2 0.000
Adj R-squared 0.386 Pseudo R2 0.342
 
(d) dummy variable          
* significant at 1% level          
* * significant at 5 level          
*** significant at 10% level 
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Table 11 
Regression of expected time to retirement and Probit regression of self-reported 
retirement status (Changes in interest rate for pension value calculation) 
 
OLS OLS Probit Probit
s2 s3 s2 s3
Independent Variables Coefficient Std err. Coefficient Std err. Coefficient Std err. Coefficient Std err.
Pension, wealth, and earning
DB only (d) -0.1666 0.1585 -0.1678 0.1584 0.0050 0.0565 0.0060 0.0565
DC only (d) 0.4601 * 0.1719 0.4592 * 0.1719 -0.2076 * 0.0665 -0.2109 * 0.0665
DB & DC (d) -0.1473 0.1830 -0.1488 0.1829 -0.4986 * 0.0802 -0.5068 * 0.0801
Pension option value (log) -0.0022 0.0151 -0.0017 0.0151 -0.1791 * 0.0080 -0.1792 * 0.0081
Pension wealth (log) -0.0306 ** 0.0151 -0.0308 ** 0.0150 0.0663 * 0.0053 0.0656 * 0.0052
Non-pension wealth (log) -0.1548 * 0.0223 -0.1548 * 0.0223 0.0116 0.0077 0.0117 0.0077
Earnings (log) 0.0361 0.0292 0.0360 0.0292 -0.1559 * 0.0186 -0.1561 * 0.0186
Longevity risk
AEW 5.2860 * 0.8856 5.2918 * 0.8855 -0.7582 ** 0.3304 -0.7471 ** 0.3298
Age -0.8245 * 0.0239 -0.8245 * 0.0239 0.0681 * 0.0092 0.0687 * 0.0091
Low prob of. Living at 75 (d) -0.5131 * 0.1841 -0.5131 * 0.1841 0.2387 * 0.0630 0.2412 * 0.0630
Poor health (d) -0.3949 ** 0.1681 -0.3948 ** 0.1681 0.7095 * 0.0524 0.7137 * 0.0524
Health insurance
Federal Gov. health ins (d) -0.1575 0.1943 -0.1571 0.1943 0.7193 * 0.0555 0.7179 * 0.0555
Employer hl. Ins (d) 0.7037 * 0.1445 0.7036 * 0.1445 -0.6360 * 0.0664 -0.6347 * 0.0664
Retiree employer hl. Ins. (d) -0.7203 * 0.1382 -0.7207 * 0.1382 0.4250 * 0.0693 0.4213 ** 0.0692
Commercial hl. Ins. (d) 0.0297 0.1522 0.0297 0.1522 -0.1114 ** 0.0564 -0.1151 * 0.0563
Bequest motive
Children 17 or younger (d) 0.7068 * 0.1588 0.7068 * 0.1588 -0.1603 ** 0.0706 -0.1587 ** 0.0705
Number of Children 0.0116 0.0276 0.0116 0.0276 0.0230 ** 0.0103 0.0231 *** 0.0103
High bequest import. (d) 0.0785 0.1327 0.0785 0.1327 -0.0961 *** 0.0518 -0.0944 * 0.0518
High bequest prob. (d) -0.3063 *** 0.1638 -0.3061 *** 0.1638 0.2184 * 0.0631 0.2217 * 0.0631
Demographic
Education (year of) 0.0739 * 0.0237 0.0739 * 0.0237 0.0353 * 0.0089 0.0361 * 0.0089
Married (d) -0.3598 * 0.1314 -0.3597 * 0.1314 0.0854 0.0527 0.0855 0.0527
White (d) 0.2363 *** 0.1362 0.2364 *** 0.1362 0.0841 0.0528 0.0878 *** 0.0527
Born in U.S. (d) -0.3888 ** 0.1911 -0.3887 ** 0.1911 0.2070 ** 0.0830 0.2047 ** 0.0829
Myopic (d) -0.3454 * 0.1249 -0.3453 * 0.1249 0.1193 * 0.0457 0.1215 * 0.0456
Job
Self-employed (d) 1.5245 * 0.1864 1.5252 * 0.1864 -0.1497 * 0.0585 -0.1492 ** 0.0585
Tenure (current job) -0.0620 * 0.0053 -0.0620 * 0.0053 0.0251 * 0.0021 0.0250 * 0.0021
Industry: manufactory, transport (d) 0.0954 0.2032 0.0953 0.2032 0.0862 0.0773 0.0895 0.0773
Industry: service (d) 0.2909 0.2040 0.2910 0.2040 0.1069 0.0744 0.1062 0.0744
Industry: prof. svc & pub admin. (d) 0.0999 0.2141 0.0992 0.2141 -0.0471 0.0826 -0.0526 0.0825
Occupation: skilled (d) 0.3605 ** 0.1535 0.3605 ** 0.1535 0.0231 0.0595 0.0236 0.0595
Occupation: semi_skilled (d) 0.2124 0.1445 0.2126 0.1445 0.1192 ** 0.0549 0.1194 ** 0.0548
Constant 48.1198 * 1.1010 48.1102 * 1.1005 -3.4551 * 0.4580 -3.5089 * 0.4577
Number of obs 4451 4451 Number of obs 7206 7206
F 91.00 90.99 Log likelihood -2493.8 -2498.12
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 LR chi2 2497.62 2488.96
R-squared 0.390 0.390 Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000
Adj R-squared 0.385 0.385 Pseudo R2 0.334 0.333
 
Pension value is calculated on the following assumption.  
s2: Interest rate 6.0% Wage growth 5% Inflation rate 4% 
s3: Interest rate 6.5% Wage growth 5% Inflation rate 4% 
Base scenario: Interest rate 6.3% Wage growth 5% Inflation rate 4% 
 
(d) dummy variable          
* significant at 1% level          
* * significant at 5 level          
*** significant at 10% level 
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Table 12 
Regression of expected time to retirement and Probit regression of self-reported 
retirement status (Changes in utility discount rates for AEW calculation) 
 
   1    2    3
   OLS
Independent Variables Coefficient Std err. Coefficient Std err. Coefficient Std err.
Pension, wealth, and earning
DB only (d) -0.1390 0.1587 -0.0045 0.0563 0.0703 0.0635
DC only (d) 0.4899 * 0.1722 -0.2197 * 0.0664 -0.1953 * 0.0740
DB & DC (d) -0.0825 0.1828 -0.5257 * 0.0798 -0.4772 * 0.0865
Pension option value (log) 0.0007 0.0151 -0.1791 * 0.0080 -0.1748 * 0.0087
Pension wealth (log) -0.0405 * 0.0150 0.0697 * 0.0052 0.0629 * 0.0056
Non-pension wealth (log) -0.1601 * 0.0230 0.0103 0.0079 0.2268 * 0.0284
Earnings (log) 0.0465 0.0292 -0.1551 * 0.0186 -0.3944 * 0.0371
Longevity risk
AEW 2.1919 * 0.5576 -0.0064 0.2120 -0.7715 * 0.2868
Age -0.7673 * 0.0202 0.0550 * 0.0079 0.0627 * 0.0094
Low prob of. Living at 75 (d) -0.4869 * 0.1846 0.2347 * 0.0629 0.2213 * 0.0744
Poor health (d) -0.3957 ** 0.1685 0.7091 * 0.0524 0.6318 * 0.0628
Health insurance
Federal Gov. health ins (d) -0.1722 0.1947 0.7212 * 0.0555 0.5958 * 0.0647
Employer hl. Ins (d) 0.7298 * 0.1447 -0.6387 * 0.0664 -0.5572 * 0.0751
Retiree employer hl. Ins. (d) -0.7281 * 0.1385 0.4256 ** 0.0692 0.3912 0.0772
Commercial hl. Ins. (d) 0.0267 0.1526 -0.1142 * 0.0563 -0.0855 * 0.0610
Bequest motive
Children 17 or younger (d) 0.7689 * 0.1587 -0.1719 ** 0.0703 -0.2693 0.0847
Number of Children 0.0067 0.0277 0.0241 *** 0.0103 0.0190 ** 0.0122
High bequest import. (d) 0.0820 0.1330 -0.0923 * 0.0517 -0.1389 ** 0.0598
High bequest prob. (d) -0.3206 *** 0.1642 0.2156 * 0.0631 0.1616 * 0.0685
Demographic
Education (year of) 0.0737 * 0.0237 0.0362 * 0.0089 0.0365 * 0.0109
Married (d) -0.2868 ** 0.1307 0.0737 0.0524 0.1564 ** 0.0636
White (d) 0.2487 *** 0.1366 0.0788 0.0528 0.0414 0.0624
Born in U.S. (d) -0.3888 ** 0.1915 0.2073 ** 0.0827 0.1921 ** 0.0964
Myopic (d) -0.3535 * 0.1252 0.1213 * 0.0456 0.0617 0.0532
Job
Self-employed (d) 1.5688 * 0.1865 -0.1550 * 0.0584 -0.2414 * 0.0648
Tenure (current job) -0.0615 * 0.0053 0.0244 * 0.0021 0.0228 * 0.0023
Industry: manufactory, transport (d) 0.0531 0.2034 0.0990 0.0771 0.0723 0.0871
Industry: service (d) 0.2219 0.2039 0.1247 *** 0.0741 0.1432 *** 0.0841
Industry: prof. svc & pub admin. (d) -0.0381 0.2125 -0.0201 0.0818 -0.0753 0.0932
Occupation: skilled (d) 0.3338 ** 0.1537 0.0282 0.0594 0.0371 0.0663
Occupation: semi_skilled (d) 0.1234 0.1435 0.1377 ** 0.0544 0.0630 0.0614
Constant 48.9816 * 1.0870 -3.7125 * 0.4505 -3.0902 * 0.5899
Number of obs 4451 Number of obs 7206 Number of obs 5600
F 89.93 Log likelihood -2501.14 Log likelihood -1987.63
Prob > F 0.000 LR chi2 2482.94 LR chi2 1875.08
R-squared 0.387 Prob > chi2 0.000 Prob > chi2 0.000
Adj R-squared 0.383 Pseudo R2 0.332 Pseudo R2 0.321
Root MSE 3.411
   Probit    Probit
 
Model 3 excludes the highest discount groups. 
(d) dummy variable          
* significant at 1% level          
* * significant at 5 level          
*** significant at 10% level 
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Figure 1 
Participants in Pension Plans, Number of Pension Plans, and Pension Plan Assets 
by type of plan, 1975-99 
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Figure 1 (Continued) 
Participants in Pension Plans, Number of Pension Plans, and Pension Plan Assets, 1975-
1999 
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Participants in Pension Plans Number of Pension Plans Pension Plan Assets
Year Total DB DC Total DB DC Total DB DC
1975 311,094 103,346 207,748 259,963 185,950 74,013
1976 359,980 113,970 246,010 298,440 216,283 82,157
1977 402,627 121,655 280,972 325,074 233,609 91,465
1978 442,998 128,407 314,591 377,195 272,684 104,511
1979 470,921 139,489 331,432 445,430 319,595 125,835
1980 48,986           30,100           18,886           488,901 148,096 340,805 563,551 401,455 162,096
1981 50,770           30,043           20,727           545,611 167,293 378,318 628,916 444,376 184,540
1982 53,099           29,678           23,421           594,456 174,998 419,458 788,986 553,419 235,567
1983 57,680           29,878           27,802           602,848 175,143 427,705 923,470 642,359 281,111
1984 60,918           30,373           30,545           604,434 168,015 436,419 1,044,591 700,669 343,922
1985 62,063           28,895           33,168           632,135 170,172 461,963 1,252,739 826,117 426,622
1986 63,057           28,529           34,528           717,627 172,642 544,985 1,382,910 895,073 487,837
1987 63,280           28,427           34,853           733,029 163,065 569,964 1,402,488 877,269 525,219
1988 61,912           27,966           33,946           729,923 145,952 583,971 1,503,635 911,982 591,653
1989 60,997           27,136           33,861           731,356 132,467 598,889 1,675,597 987,971 687,626
1990 61,545           26,205           35,340           712,307 113,062 599,245 1,674,140 961,904 712,236
1991 61,211           25,603           35,608           699,294 101,752 597,542 1,936,271 1,101,987 834,284
1992 63,898           25,222           38,676           708,335 88,621 619,714 2,094,087 1,146,798 947,289
1993 64,394           24,986           39,408           702,097 83,596 618,501 2,316,272 1,248,180 1,068,092
1994 64,607           24,480           40,127           690,344 74,422 615,922 2,298,556 1,210,856 1,087,700
1995 65,598           23,395           42,203           693,404 69,492 623,912 2,723,736 1,402,079 1,321,657
1996 67,470           23,133           44,337           696,223 63,657           632,566         3,136,281 1,585,397 1,550,884
1997 70,270           22,619           47,651           720,041 59,499           660,542         3,553,756 1,735,604 1,818,152
1998 72,835           22,863           49,972           730,031 56,405           673,626         4,021,850 1,936,600 2,085,250
1999 73,020           22,630           50,390            
U.S. Department of Labor, Private Pension Plan Bulletin: Abstract of 1999 Form 5500 Annual 
Reports, 2004  
ACLI, Life Insurance Fact Book 
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Figure 2a 
Male Labor Force Participation Rates by Age, 1950-1998 
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Figure 2b  
Male Labor Force Participation Rates by Age, 1950-1998 
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Figure 3 
Pension accruals as the ratio of pension accruals to wage at each age 
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Figure 4 
Hazard Functions 
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